STUDIES IN JAINISM

(Being a collection of three original, important and informative articles on Jainism)

BY

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PUBLISHED BY

Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Karyalay

(AHMEDABAD)

SOLE AGENTS:

Gurjara Grantharatna Karyalay

Gandhi Road, Ahmedabad.

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V. S. 2002]   Price: Two Rupees   [1946 A. D.

Published by Shambhulal J. Shah, for the
Jaina Sahitya Samshodhaka Karyalay,
AHMEDABAD.

Printed by Ramchandra Yesu Shedge,
Nirnaya Sagar Press, 26-28 Kolbhat street,
BOMBAY 2.

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By the same Author

We intend to publish shortly a similar volume containing various scholarly writings of this great savant, relating to Jainism, such as the Introductions to *Ācārāṅgasūtra* and *Kalpasūtra* (*SBE*, Vol. 22), and *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* (*SBE*, Vol. 45), and other articles.

PREFACE

THE late lamented Professor Dr. Hermann Jacobi, Bonn (Germany), was an outstanding savant who enriched the treasure of Oriental Learning by his various valuable contributions and even led the front of research in different branches of Indological studies. In the fields of Jaina and Prākrit studies Professor Jacobi can be looked upon as a Pioneer: and his investigations, extended over dozens of years, have a unique value in assessing the progress of studies. It is mainly due to his labours that suitable position could be assigned to Jainism and Jaina philosophy in the evolution of religion and thought on the Indian soil. It is to him that we owe the authentic translation of four canonical works in the S. B. E. series; the two Introductions form a substantial contribution to our knowledge of Jainism, especially of its career earlier than Buddhism. All research is a progressive current; and this is all the more true with regard to Jaina research, because in the beginning the scholars had to work with scanty material which, with the passage of time, is coming out in a voluminous magnitude.

The three essays of Jacobi, included in this book have a significant value, inasmuch as they can be safely accepted as the basis for further researches in Jainism and Jaina philosophy. The first, JAINISM, is taken from the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. VII, pp. 465-474, edited

by J. Hastings, London; the second, THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF THE JAINAS in the *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, vol. II, pp. 59-66, Oxford 1908; and the third, THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THOUGHT, is being printed and published, as far as I know, for the first time in this book. It was written in 1922, as is seen from the date put at the end of the article. The original manuscript of this article which has been written in Jacobi's own hand-writing was obtained by me through my late, lamented friend, Mr. K. P. Mody, of Ahmedabad.

Some of the observations of Jacobi may require modification and restatement. That is but natural and inevitable. In fact, even Jacobi himself revised some of his earlier opinions about Jainism and Jaina philosophy during his life time in the light of his advancing studies. Minor points, here and there, in these essays may require ratification; but on the whole these essays still hold the ground and can worthily serve as the starting points for further studies. It is with this idea that they are issued in a separate book, especially because the original sources are not easily accessible.

When I went to Germany in 1928 with a view to acquiring first-hand knowledge of the methods of research and with a view to establishing close contact with the German scholars working on Indological subjects and especially on Jainism and Jain literature, the great scholar, Dr. Hermann Jacobi immediately came from Bonn specially to meet me in Hamburg and invited me with great

affection to come there and stay with him for some months. He stayed in Hamburg with his son for some days during which we had several and varied discussions particularly on Jainism and Jain literature. I still remember, quite vividly, his high admiration for the cultural contributions of Jainism and Jaina literature in enriching the Indian heritage and his fervent enthusiasm for the progress of studies connected with them. In issuing this book, I record my feelings of respect to the soul of Hermann Jacobi and my sense of gratitude to the original Publishers of the first two essays. My thanks are due to my dear friend, Dr. A. N. Upadhye and my diligent colleague, Dr. A. S. Gopani for their assistance in carrying this book through the press.

Though written at different times, say within a quarter of a century, these three essays have an inherent connection among themselves; so we have brought out this volume mainly for the benefit of research and lay students of Jainism. If they feel benefited by this handy volume, quite within their reach, our purpose of publishing it, even during the hard period of war, is more than fulfilled.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Bombay 7
Dated 23-12-1946.

Muni Jina Vijaya

JAINISM

1. INTRODUCTORY.

Jainism is a monastic religion which, like Buddhism, denies the authority of the Veda, and is therefore regarded by the Brāhmans as heretical. The Jain church consists of the monastic order and the lay community. It is divided into two rival sections, the Śvetāmbaras, or 'White-robed' and the Digambaras, or 'Sky-clad'; they are so called because the monks of the Śvetāmbaras wear white clothes, and those of the Digambaras originally went about stark naked, until the Muhammadans forced them to cover their privities. The dogmatic differences between the two sections are rather trivial[1]; they differ more in conduct, as will be noticed in the course of the article.

The interest of Jainism to the student of religion consists in the fact that it goes back to a very early period, and to primitive currents of religious and metaphysical speculation, which gave rise also to the oldest Indian philosophies–Sāṅkhya and Yoga[2]–and to Buddhism. It shares in the theoretical pessimism of these systems, as also in their, practical ideal–liberation. Life in the world perpetuated by the transmigration of the soul, is essentially bad and painful; therefore it must be

1 See the article 'Digambara', *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

2 See those articles, *ERE.*

our aim to put an end to the Cycle of Births, and this end will be accomplished when we come into possession of right knowledge[3]. In this general principle Jainism agrees with Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism; but they differ in their methods of realizing it. In metaphysics there is some general likeness between Sāṅkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Jainism on the other. For in all these systems a dualism of matter and soul is acknowledged; the souls are principally all alike substances (monads) characterized by intelligence, their actual difference being caused by their connexion with matter; matter is, according to Jains and Sāṅkhyas, of indefinite nature a something that may become anything. These general metaphysical principles, however, are worked out on different lines by the Sāṅkhyas and Jains[4], the difference being still more

3 It may be added that, with the exception of Yoga, all these ancient systems are strictly atheistic, *i. e.* they do not admit an absolute Supreme God; even in Yoga, the Iśvara is not the first and only cause of everything existent.

4 The Sāṅkhyas endeavour to explain, from their dualistic principles, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the development of the material world as well as that of living beings; the Jains, however, are almost exclusively concerned with the latter, and declare that the cause of the material world and of the structure of the universe is *lokasthiti*, 'primeval disposition' (*Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, iii, 6 com.). Sāṅkhya, probably based on cosmogonic theories contained in the Upaniṣads, was intended as a philosophic system which in the course of time became the theoretical foundation of popular religion. But Jainism was, in the first place, a religion, and developed a philosophy of its own in order to make this religion, a self-consistent system.

accentuated by the different origins of these systems. For the Sāṅkhyas, owing allegiance to the Brāhmans, have adopted Brāhmanical ideas and modes of thought[5], while the Jains, being distinctly non-Brāhmanical, have worked upon popular notions of a more primitive and cruder character, *e. g.* animistic ideas. But the metaphysical principles of Buddhism are of an entirely different character, being moulded by the fundamental principle of Buddhism, viz. that there is no absolute and permanent Being, or, in other words, that all things are transitory.[6] Notwithstanding the radical difference in their philosophical notions, Jainism and Buddhism, being originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brāhmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, so that even Indian writers occasionally have confounded them. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jain literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism[7]. But it has since been proved beyond doubt that their theory is wrong, and that Jainism is at least as old as

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5 *e. g.*, the Sāṅkhya principle *mahān* means *mahān ātmā*; the three *guṇas* are suggested by the *trivṛtkaraṇa* of *Chāndogya Up.* vi. 3 f; and *prakṛti* by the cosmical *brahmā* of the earlier Upaniṣad doctrine, wherefore in the *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya* on *Kārikā* 22 *brahmā* is given as a synonym of *prakṛti*, etc.

6 The fundamental theories of Jainism, *e. g.* the *syādvāda*, their division of living beings, especially the elementary lives, are not found in Buddhism.

7 See *SBE* xlv. (1895) Introd., pp. xviii ff.

Buddhism. For the canonical books of the Buddhists frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigaṇṭha (Skr. *Nirgrantha*, common Prākrit *Nigganṭha*) and their leader in Buddha's time, Nātaputta (Nāta- or Nātiputta being an epithet of the last prophet of the Jains, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra), and they name the place of the latter's death Pāvā, in agreement with Jain tradition. On the other hand, the canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvīra the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career, and one of the latter's rivals. Thus it is established that Mahāvīra was a contemporary of Buddha, and probably somewhat older than the latter, who outlived his rival's decease at Pāvā.

Mahāvīra, however, unlike Buddha, was most probably not the founder of the sect which reveres him as their prophet, nor the author of their religion. According to the unanimous Buddhist tradition, Buddha had, under the Bodhi-tree, discovered by intuition the fundamental truths of his religion as it appears throughout his personal work; his first sermons are things ever to be remembered by his followers, as are the doctrines which he then preached. No such traditions are preserved in the canonical books of the Jains about Mahāvīra. His becoming a monk, and, some 12 years later, his attainment of omniscience (*kevala*), are, of course, celebrated events. But tradition is silent about his motives for renouncing the world, and about the particular truths whose discovery led to his exalted position. At any rate, Mahāvīra is not described by tradition as having first become a disciple of teachers whose doctrines afterwards

failed to satisfy him, as we are told of Buddha; he seems to have had no misgivings, and to have known where truth was to be had[8], and thus he became a Jain monk. And again, when, after many years of austerities such as are practised by other ascetics of the Jains, he reached omniscience, we are not given to understand that he found any new truth, or a new revelation, as Buddha is said to have received; nor is any particular doctrine or philosophical principle mentioned, the knowledge and insight of which then occurred to him for the first time. But he is represented as gaining, at his *kevala*, perfect knowledge of what he knew before only in part and imperfectly. Thus Mahāvīra appears in the tradition of his own sect as one who, from the beginning, had followed a religion established long ago; had he been more, had he been the founder of Jainism, tradition, ever eager to extol a prophet, would not have totally repressed his claims to reverence as such. Nor do

8 A. F. R. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 5 f., note (Calcutta, 1890), says that Mahāvīra, having been born in Kollāga, 'naturally, when he assumed the monk's vocation, retired (as related in *Kalpasūtra* 115 f.) to the *ceïya* of his own clan, called Dūipalāsa and situated in the neighbourhood of Kollāga. Mahāvīra's parents (and with them probably their whole clan of Nāya Kṣattriyas) are said to have been followers of the tenets of Pārśvanātha (see *Āyāraṅga*, ii, 15, § 16). As such they would, no doubt, keep up a religious establishment (*ceïya*) for the accommodation of Pārśva, on his periodical visits, with his disciples, to Kuṇḍapura or Vesālī. Mahāvīra, on renouncing the world, would probably first join Pārśva's sect, in which, however, he soon became a reformer and chief himself.'

Buddhistic traditions indicate that the Niganṭhas owed their origin to Nātaputta; they simply speak of them as of a sect existing at the time of Buddha. We cannot, therefore, without doing violation to tradition, declare Mahāvīra to have been the founder of Jainism. But he is without doubt the last prophet of the Jains, the last Tīrthakara. His predecessor, Pārśva, the last Tīrthakara but one, seems to have better claims to the title of founder of Jainism. His death is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahāvīra, while Pārśva's predecessor Ariṣṭanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa. Followers of Pārśva are mentioned in the canonical books; and a legend in the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* xxiii relates a meeting between a disciple of Pārśva and a disciple of Mahāvīra which brought about the union of the old branch of the Jain church and the new one[9]. This seems to indicate that Pārśva was a historical person; but in the absence of historical documents we cannot venture to go beyond a conjecture.

2. JAIN VIEW OF THEIR ORIGIN, ETC.

According to the belief of the T... Jain religion is eternal, and it h... again and again, in ... succeeding periods ... Tīrthakaras. In ... the first Tīrthakara ... 24th, was V... colours of the 24 T...

9 *SBE*, xlv Introd. p.

(1) Ṛṣabha (or Vṛṣabha), bull, golden; (2) Ajita, elephant, golden; (3) Sambhava, horse, golden; (4) Abhinandana, ape, golden; (5) Sumati, heron, golden; (6) Padmaprabha, lotus-flower, red; (7) Supārśva, the *svastika*, golden; (8) Candraprabha, moon, white; (9) Suvidhi (or Puṣpadanta), dolphin, white; (10) Śītala, the *śrīvatsa*, golden; (11) Śreyāṁsa (or Śreyān), rhinoceros, golden; (12) Vāsupūjya, buffalo, red; (13) Vimala, hog, golden; (14) Ananta (or Anantajit), falcon, golden; (15) Dharma, thunderbolt, golden; (16) Śānti, antelope, golden; (17) Kunthu, goat, golden; (18) Ara, the *nandyāvarta*, golden; (19) Malli, jar, blue; (20) Suvrata (or Munisuvrata), tortoise, black; (21) Nami, blue lotus, golden; (22) Nemi (or Ariṣṭanemi), conch shell, black; (23) Pārśva, snake, blue; (24) Vardhamāna, lion, golden. All Tīrthakaras were Kṣatriyas; Munisuvrata and Nemi belonged to the Harivaṁśa, the remaining 22 to the Ikṣvāku race. Malli was a woman, according to the Śvetāmbaras; but this the Digambaras deny, as, according to them, no female can reach liberation. The interval in years between Mahāvīra and the two last Tīrthakaras has been given above. Nami died 500,000 years before Nemi; Munisuvrata 1,100,000 years before Nami; the next intervals are 6,500,000, 10,000,000, [illegible] krore; the following intervals cannot be expressed in definite numbers of years, but are given in *palyopamas* and *sāgaropamas*, the last interval being one krore of krores of *sāgaropamas*. The length of the life and the height of the Tīrthakaras are in proportion to the length of the

interval.[10] These particulars are here given according to the Śvetāmbaras.

In connexion with these items of the mythological history of the Jains, it may be added that they relate the legends of 12 universal monarchs (Cakravartins), of 9 Vāsudevas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Prativāsudevas who lived within the period from the first to the 22nd Tīrthakara. Together with the 24 Tīrthakaras they are the 63 great personages of Jain history; the legends of their lives form the subject of a great epic work by Hemacandra–the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita*, which is based on older sources, probably the *Vāsudevahiṇḍī* (edited in Bhāvnagar, 1906–09, by the Jainadharmaprasārakasabhā).

All Tīrthakaras have reached Nirvāṇa at their death. Though, being released from the world, they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, they have nevertheless become the object of worship and are regarded as the 'gods' (*deva*) by the Jains[11]; temples are erected to them where their idols are worshipped[12]. The favourite Tīrthakaras are the first and the three last ones, but temples of the remaining ones are also met with. The worship of the idols of the Tīrthakaras

10 See the articles, Ages of the World (Indian), *ERE*, i, pp. 200 f.

11 See the article Atheism (Jain), *ERE*, ii, pp. 186 f.

12 For images and idols of the Jains see J. Burgess, 'Digambara Jain Iconography,' *IA* xxxii. (1903) 459 ff.; G. Bühler, 'Specimens of Jaina Sculptures from Mathura in *Epigraphia Indica*, ii. (1894) 311 ff.; J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *Cave Temples*, London, 1880, pp. 487 ff:

is already mentioned in some canonical books, but no rules for their worship are given[13]; it was, however, already in full sway in the first century of our era, as evidenced by the *Paümacariya*, the oldest Prākrit *kāvya* of the Jains, and by the statues of Tīrthakaras found in ancient sites—*e. g.*, in the Kaṅkālī mound at Mathurā which belongs to this period[14]. Some sects, especially, a rather recent section of the Śvetāmbaras, the Dhuṇḍhīā or Sthānakavāsins, reject this kind of worship altogether[15].

It goes without saying that the Tīrthakaras, except the two last, belong to mythology rather than to history; the 22nd, Ariṣṭanemi, is connected with the legend of Kṛṣṇa as his relative. But the details of Mahāvīra's life as related in the canonical books may be regarded on the whole as historical facts.

He was a Kṣatriya of the Jñāta clan and a native of Kuṇḍagrāma, a suburb of the town Vaiśālī (the modern Basārh, some 27 miles north of Patna[16]). He was the second son of the Kṣatriya

13 Some kind of worship, however, seems to be implied from the oldest times by the mention of the various *ceïya* (*caitya*), or shrines, in the sacred books. These shrines were situated in gardens in which Mahāvīra resided during his visits to the towns to which they belonged. Cf. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 2, note 4.

14 *Epigr. Ind.* ii. 311 f.

15 See 'Notes on the non-Idolatrous Shwetambar Jains,' by 'Seeker,' 1911; and Margaret Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, pp. 13 f.

16 Kuṇḍaggāma and Vāṇiyaggāma, both suburbs of Vesāli, have been identified by Hoernle (*loc. cit.* p. 4, note 8) with the modern villages Bāniyā and Basukuṇḍ.

Siddhārtha and Triśalā, a highly connected lady. The Śvetāmbaras maintain, and thus it is stated in the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, the *Kalpasūtra*, etc., that the soul of the Tīrthakara first descended into the womb of the Brāhmaṇī Devānandā, and was, by the order of Indra, removed thence to the womb of Triśalā[17]. But the Digambaras reject this story. His parents, who were pious Jains and worshippers of Pārśva, gave him the name Vardhamāna (Vīra or Mahāvīra is an epithet used as a name; Arhat, Bhagavat, Jina, etc., are titles common to all Tīrthakaras). He married Yaśodā and by her had a daughter Aṇojjā. His parents died when he was 30 years old, and his elder brother Nandivardhana succeeded his father in whatever position he had held. With the permission of his brother and the other authorities, he carried out a long-cherished resolve and became a monk with the usual Jain rites. Then followed 12 years of self-mortification; Mahāvīra wandered about as a mendicant friar, bearing all kinds of hardships; after the first 13 months he even discarded clothes. At the end of this period dedicated to meditation, he reached the state of omniscience (*kevala*), corresponding to the Bodhi of the Buddhists. He lived for 42 years more, preaching the law and instructing his 11 disciples (*gaṇadhara*): Indrabhūti, Agnibhūti, Vāyubhūti, Ārya Vyakta, Ārya Sudharman, Maṇḍitaputra, Mauryaputra, Akampita,

17 Cf. the transfer of the embryo of Baladeva from the womb of Rohiṇī to that of Devakī, whence he got the name Saṁkarṣaṇa, still retaining the metronymic Rauhiṇeya.

Acalabhrātṛ, Metārya and Prabhāsa. In the 72nd year of his life he died at Pāvā and reached Nirvāṇa. This event took place, as stated above, some years before Buddha's death, and may, therefore, be placed about 480 B. C. The Śvetāmbaras, however, place the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, which is the initial point of their era, 470 years before the beginning of the Vikrama era, or in 527 B. C.[18] The Digambaras place the same event 18 yearslater.

3. CANONICAL LITERATURE OF THE S'VETĀMBARAS.

The canonical books of the Śvetāmbaras (the Digambaras do not admit them to be genuine) are not works by Mahāvīra himself, but some of them claim to be discourses delivered by him to Indrabhūti, the Gautama, which his disciple, the *gaṇadhara* Sudharman, related to his own disciple Jambusvāmin.

Before entering on details about the existing canon, it must be stated that, according to the Jains, there were originally, since the time of the first Tīrthakara, two kinds of sacred books, the 14 *pūrvas* and the 11 *aṅgas;* the 14 *pūrvas* were, however, reckoned to make up a 12th *aṅga* under the name of Dṛṣṭivāda. The knowledge of the 14 *pūrvas* continued only down to Sthūlabhadra,

18 In the Preface to his ed. of the Pariśiṣṭa Parvan (Bibl. Ind., Calcutta, 1891), p. 4 ff., the present writer criticises the Śvetāmbara tradition, and, by combining the Jain date of Chandragupta's accession to the throne in 155 after the Nirvāṇa with the historical date of the same event in 321 or 322 B. C., arrives at 476 or 477 B. C. as the probable date of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.

the 8th patriarch after Mahāvīra; the next 7 patriarchs down to Vajra knew only 10 *pūrvas*, and after that time the remaining *pūrvas* were gradually lost, until, at the time when the canon was written down in books (980 A. V.), all the *pūrvas* had disappeared, and consequently the 12th *aṅga* too. Such is the Śvetāmbara tradition regarding the *pūrvas*; that of the Digambaras is similar as regards the final loss of the *pūrvas*, differing, however, in most details; but they contend that the *aṅgas* also were lost after 9 more generations[19].

The 11 *aṅgas* are the oldest part of the canon (*siddhānta*), which at present embraces 45 texts. Besides the 11 *aṅgas*, there are 12 *upāṅgas*, 10 *paiṇṇas* (*prakīrṇas*), 6 *chedasūtras*, *Nandī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, 4 *mūlasūtras*. A list of these texts according to the usual enumeration follows[20].

(1) 11 *aṅgas*: Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta, Sthāna, Samavāya, Bhagavatī, Jñātādharmakathās, Upāsakadaśās, Antakṛddaśās, Anuttaraupapātikadaśās, Praśnavyākaraṇa, Vipāka (Dṛṣṭivāda, no longer extant); (2) 12 *upāṅgas*: Aupapātika, Rājapraśnīya, Jīvābhigama, Prajñāpanā, Jambudvīpaprajñapti, Candraprajñapti, Sūryaprajñapti, Nirayāvali [or Kalpika], Kalpāvataṁsikā, Puṣpikā, Puṣpacūlikā, Vṛṣṇidaśās; (3) 10 *paiṇṇas* (*prakīrṇas*): Catuḥśaraṇa, Saṁstāra, Āturapratyākhyāna, Bhaktaparijñā, Taṇḍu-

19 For details see A. A. Guérinot, *Rèpertoire d'épigraphie Jaina*, Paris, 1908, p. 36.

20 For details see Weber, 'Sacred Literature of the Jainas, which first appeared (in German)' in *Indische Studien*, xvi. (1883), and xvii. (1885), and was translated in *IA* xvii. (1888)–xxi. (1892).

lavaiyāli, Candāvija, Devendrastava, Gaṇivija, Mahāpratyākhyāna, Vīrastava; (4) 6 *chedasūtras*: Niśītha, Mahāniśitha, Vyavahāra, Daśāśrutaskandha, Bṛhatkalpa, Pañcakalpa; (5) 2 *sūtras* without a common name: Nandī and Anuyogadvāra; (6) 4 *mūlasūtras*: Uttarādhyayana, Āvaśyaka, Daśavaikālika and Piṇḍaniryukti. Most of the canonical books have been edited in India, some with commentaries. English translations have been published of the Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Upāsakadaśās, Antakṛddaśās, Anuttaraupapatikadaśās, Uttarādhyayana and two Kalpasūtras.

The redaction of the canon took place under Devarddhigaṇi in 980 after the Nirvāṇa (A. D. 454, according to the common reckoning, actually perhaps 60 years later); before that time the sacred texts were handed down without embodying them in written books. In the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts, and even afterwards, they have undergone many alterations—transposition of parts, additions, etc.—traces of which can still be pointed out[21]. Along with these alterations there seems to have gone on a gradual change of the language in which the texts were composed. The original language, according to the Jains, was Ardhamāgadhī, and they give that name, or Māgadhī, to the language of the present texts. But it has, most probably, been modernised during the process of oral transmission. The older parts of the canon contain many archaic forms for which in later texts distinct Māhārāṣṭrī idioms are substituted. It

21 See Weber, *loc. cit.* 8.

will be best to call the language of the sacred texts simply Jain Prākrit, and that of later works Jain Māhārāṣṭrī.

As the works belonging to the canon are of different origin and age, they differ greatly in character. Some are chiefly in prose, some in verse and some in mixed prose and verse. Frequently a work comprises distinctly disparate parts put together when the redaction of the canon took place. The older prose works are generally very diffuse and contain endless repetitions; some, however, contain succinct rules, some, besides lengthy descriptions, systematic expositions of various dogmatic questions; in others, again, the systematic tendency prevails throughout. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the more important texts.[22] Besides the sacred literature and the commentaries belonging to it, the Jains possess separate works, in close material agreement with the former, which contain systematic expositions of their faith, or parts of it, in Prākrit and Sanskrit. These works, which generally possess the advantage of accuracy and clearness, have in their turn become the object of learned labours of commentators. One of the oldest is Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, a Śvetāmbara, work, which, however, is also claimed by the Digambaras.[23] A sort of encyclopaedia of Jainism

22 The development of this commenting literature has been studied by E. Leumann, *ZDMG* xlvi. (1892) 585 ff.

23 The Skr. text with a German tr. and explanation has been published by the present writer in *ZDMG* lx. (1906) 287 ff., 512 ff.; text and *bhāṣya* are contained in the *Bibl. Ind.* edition (Calcutta, 1905).

is the *Lokaprakāśa*[24] by Tejapāla's son, Vinayavijaya (1652). On these and similar works our sketch of the Jain faith is chiefly based.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own, in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prākrit. Of peculiar interest are the numerous tales in Prākrit and Sanskrit with which authors used to illustrate dogmatical or moral problems. They have also attempted more extensive narratives, some in a more popular style, as Haribhadra's *Samarāichchakahā*, and Siddharṣi's great allegorical work *Upamitibhavaprapañchā kathā* (both edited in *Bibl. Ind.*, Calcutta, 1901–14), some in highly artificial Sanskrit, as Somadeva's *Yaśastilaka* and Dhanapāla's Tilakamañjarī (both published in the Kāvyamālā, Bombay, 1901–03, 1903). Their oldest Prākrit poem (perhaps of the 3rd cent. A. D.), the *Paūmachariya*, is a Jain version of the Rāmāyaṇa. Sanskrit poems, both in *purāṇa* and in *kāvya* style, and hymns in Prākrit and Sanskrit, are very numerous with the Śvetāmbaras as well as the Digambaras; there are likewise some Jain dramas. Jain authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches–grammar, lexicography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc.[25]

4. THE DOCTRINES OF JAINISM.

Jain doctrines may be broadlydi vided into (i.) philosophical and (ii.) practical. Jain philosophy

24 Edited by Hirālāla Haṃsarāja, 3 vols., Jāmnagar, 1910.
25 Cf. art. Hemachandra, *ERE*, vol. VI. p. 591.

contains ontology, metaphysics, and psychology. The practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism, and the life of the laity.

i. (*a*) *Philosophy.*—The Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads had maintained or were believed to maintain, that Being is one, permanent, without beginning, change, or end. In opposition to this view, the Jains declare that Being is not of a persistent and unalterable nature: Being, they say, 'is joined to production, continuation, and destruction'.[26] This theory, they call the theory of the 'Indefiniteness of Being' (*anekāntavāda*); it comes to this: existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter; this matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus, clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish. It is clear that the Brāhmanical speculations are concerned with transcendental Being, while the Jain view deals with Being as given in common experience.

The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called *Syādvāda*, to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jain system itself.

26 See H. Jacobi, 'The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainas,' in Trans. of the Congress for the Hist. of Religion, Oxford, 1908, ii. 60. [This paper is included in this book, after this article. A. N. U.].

According to this doctrine of Syādvāda, there are 7 forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word *syāt*, e. g., *syād asti sarvaṁ*, *syād nāsti sarvaṁ*. *Syāt* means 'may be', and is explained by *kathaṁchit*, which in this connexion may be translated 'somehow'. The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti*, and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam*). For example, we say a jar is somehow, *i. e.*, it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption of the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (*asti*) and 'is not' (*nāsti*). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*); for existent and non-existent (*sat* and *asat*) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the 7 propositions, or *sapta bhaṅgas*, of the *Syādvāda*.

Supplementary to the doctrine of the *Syadvāda*, and, in a way, the logical complement to it, is the doctrine of the *nayas*.[27] The *nayas* are ways of expressing the nature of things: all these ways of judgment, according to the Jains, are one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are 7 *nayas*, 4 referring to concepts, and 3 to words. The reason for this variety

27 Ib. 61.

of statement is that Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins contend, but is of a complicated nature; therefore every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and, if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we are bound to go astray. Hence it is usual in explaining notions to state what the thing under discussion is with reference to substance, place, time, and state of being.

(*b*) *Metaphysics.* – All things, *i. e.* substances (*dravya*), are divided into lifeless things (*ajīvakāya*) and lives or souls (*jīva*). The former are again divided into (1) space (*ākāśa*); (2) and (3) two subtle substances called *dharma* and *adharma*, and (4) matter (*pudgala*). Space, *dharma*, and *adharma* are the necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter; space affords them room to subsist; *dharma* makes it possible for them to move or to be moved; and *adharma*, to rest. It will be seen that the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical. But the conception of the two cosmical substances *dharma* and *adharma*, which occur already, in the technical meaning just given in canonical books, seems to be developed from a more primitive notion. For, as their names *dharma* and *adharma* indicate, they seem to have denoted, in primitive speculation, those invisible 'fluids' which by contact cause sin and merit. The Jains, using for the latter notions the

terms *pāpa* and *puṇya*, were free to use the current names of those 'fluids' in a new sense not known to other Indian thinkers.

Space (*ākāśa*) is divided into that part of space which is occupied by the world of things (*lokākāśa*), and the space beyond it (*alokākāśa*), which is absolutely void and empty, an abyss of nothing. *Dharma* and *adharma* are co-extensive with the world; accordingly no soul nor any particle of matter can get beyond this world for want of the substrates of motion and rest. Time is recognized by some as a quasi-substance besides those enumerated.

Matter (*pudgala*) is eternal and consists of atoms; otherwise it is not determined in its nature, but, as is already implied by the doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being, it is something that may become anything, as earth, water, fire, wind, etc. Two states of matter are distinguished: gross matter, of which the things which we perceive consist, and subtle matter, which is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter, for instance, is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of *karma* (see below). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. Two atoms form a compound when the one is viscous and the other dry, or both are of different degrees either of viscousness or dryness. Such compounds combine with others, and so on. They are, however, not constant in their nature, but are subject to change or development (*pariṇāma*), which consists in the assumption of qualities (*guṇas*). In this way

originate also the bodies and senses of living beings. The elements-earth, water, fire, and wind-are bodies of souls in the lowest stage of development, and are, therefore, spoken of as 'earth-bodies' 'water-bodies', etc. Here we meet with animistic ideas which, in this form, are peculiar to Jainism. They probably go back to a remote period, and must have prevailed in classes of Indian society which were not influenced by the more advanced ideas of the Brāhmans.

Different from matter and material things are the souls (*jiva*, lit. 'lives'). There is an infinite number of souls; the whole world is literally filled with them. The souls are substances, and as such eternal; but they are not of a definite size, since they contract or expand according to the dimensions of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. Their characteristic mark is intelligence, which may be obscured by extrinsic causes, but never destroyed.

Souls are of two kinds: mundane (*saṁsārin*), and liberated (*mukta*). Mundane souls are the embodied souls of living beings in the world and still subject to the Cycle of Birth; liberated souls will be embodied no more; they have accomplished absolute purity; they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, and have no more to do with worldly affairs; they have reached *nirvāṇa* (*nirvṛti*, or *mukti*). Metaphysically the difference between the mundane and the liberated soul consists in this, that the former is entirely filled by subtle matter, as, a bag is filled with sand,

while the latter is absolutely pure and free from any material alloy.

The defilement of the soul takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into *karma* pours into the soul; this is called 'influx' (āśrava). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passions (*kaṣāya*) which act like a viscous substance and retain the subtle matter coming into contact with the soul; the subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it; this is called the binding (*bandha*) (of *karma*-matter). The subtle matter 'bound' or amalgamated by the soul is transformed into the 8 kinds of *karma*, and forms a kind of subtle body (*kārmaṇaśarīra*) which clings to the soul in all its migrations and future births, and determines the individual state and lot of that particular soul. For, as each particular *karma* has been caused by some action, good, bad, or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so this *karma*, in its turn, produces certain painful, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. Now, when a particular *karma* has produced its effect in the way described, it (*i. e.* the particular *karma*-matter) is discharged or purged from the soul. This process of 'purging off' is called *nirjarā*. When this process goes on without interruption, all *karma*-matter will, in the end, be discharged from the soul; and the latter, now freed from the weight which had kept it down before the time of its liberation (for matter is heavy, and *karma* is material), goes up in a straight [illegible] the top of the universe where—

the liberated souls dwell. But in the usual course of things the purging and binding processes go on simultaneously, and thereby the soul is forced to continue its mundane existence. After the death of an individual, this soul, together with its *kārmaṇasarīra*, goes, in a few moments, to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

Embodied souls are living beings, the classification of which is a subject not only of theoretical but also of great practical interest to the Jains. *As their highest duty (parama dharma) is not to* kill any living beings (*ahiṁsā*), it becomes incumbent on them to know the various forms which life may assume. The Jains divide, living beings according to the number of sense-organs which they possess: the highest (*pañchendriya*) possess all five organs, viz. those of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing, while the lowest (*ekendriya*) have only the organ of touch, and the remaining classes each one organ more than the preceding one in the order of organs given above; e. g. worms, etc., possess the organs of touch and teste; ants, etc., possess, in addition, smell; bees, etc., seeing; The vertebrates possess all five organs of sense; the higher animals, men, denizens of hell, and gods possess an internal organ or mind (*manas*), and are therefore called rational (*saṁjñin*), while the lower animals have no mind (*asaṁjñin*). The notions of the Jains about [illegible] one organ are, in part, peculiar t[illegible] for a more detailed notice[illegible]

It has already been stated that the four elements are animated by souls; *i. e.,* particles of earth, etc., are the body of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again, in the same or another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organed lives are plants; of some plants each is the body of one soul only, but of other plants each is an aggregation of embodied souls which have all functions of life, as respiration and nutrition, in common. That plants possess souls is an opinion shared by other Indian philosophers. But, the Jains have developed this theory in a remarkable way. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant-lives may also be subtle, *i. e.* invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. These subtle plants are called *nigoda;* they are composed of an infinite number of souls forming a very small cluster, have respiration and nutrition in common, and experience the most exquisite pains. Innumerable *nigodas* form a globule, and with them the whole space of the world is closely packed, like a box filled with powder. The *nigodas* furnish the supply of souls in place of those who have reached *nirvāṇa*. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single *nigoda* has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the *nirvāṇa* of all the souls that have been liberated from the beginningless past down to

the present. Thus it is evident that the *saṁsāra* will never be empty of living beings (see *Lokaprakāsa*, vi. 31 ff.).

From another point of view mundane beings are divided into four grades: denizens of hell, animals, men, and gods; these are the four walks of life (*gati*), in which beings are born according to their merits or demerits.[28]

We have seen the cause of the soul's embodiment is the presence in it of *karma*-matter. The theory of *karma* is the key-stone of the Jain system; it is necessary, therefore, to explain this theory in more detail. The natural qualities of soul are perfect knowledge (*jñāna*), intuition or

28 The Jains recognize 5 bodies which an individual may possess (though not all simultaneously), one gross and 4 subtle ones. Besides the *kārmaṇaśarīra*, which is the receptacle of *karma* and has no bodily functions, there are (1) the transmutation body (*Vaikriyaśarīra*), producing the wonderful appearances which gods, magicians, etc., may assume; (2) the translocation body (*āhārakaśarīra*), which certain sages may assume for a short time in order to consult a Tīrthakara at some distance; (3) the igneous body (*taijasaśarīra*), which in common beings causes the digestion of food, but in persons of merit gives effect to their curses (that they burn their objects) and to their benedictions (that they gladden as the rays of the moon), etc. This doctrine of the subtle bodies, in which, however, many details are subject to controversy, seems to be the outcome of very primitive ideas about magic etc. which the Jains attempted to reduce to a rational theory. With the terms *vaikriya-* and *taijasaśarīra* may be compared the *vaikārika* and *taijasa ahaṁkāra* of the Sāṅkhyas.

faith (*darśana*), highest bliss, and all sorts of perfections; but these inborn qualities of the soul are weakened or obscured, in mundane souls, by the presence of *karma*. From this point of view the division of *karma* will be understood. When *karma*-matter has penetrated the soul, it is transformed into 8 kinds (*prakṛti*) of *karma* singly or severally, which form the *kārmaṇasarīra*, just as food is, by digestion, transformed into the various fluids necessary for the support end growth of the body. The 8 kinds of *karma* are as follows.

(1) *Jñānāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures the inborn right knowledge (*i. e.* omniscience) of the soul and thereby produces different degrees of knowledge and of ignorance;[29] (2) *darśanāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures right intuition, e.g. sleep; (3) *vedanīya*, that which obscures the bliss-nature of the soul and thereby produces pleasure and pain; (4) *mohanīya*, that which disturbs the right attitude of the soul with regard to faith, conduct, passions, and other emotions, and produces doubt, error, right or wrong conduct, passions, and various mental states. The following 4 kinds of *karma* concern more the individual status of a being; (5) *āyuṣka*, that which determines the length of life of an individual in one birth as hell-being, animal, man, or god; (6) *nāma*, that which produces the various circums-

29 For details, see *ERE*, the artt. Demons and Spirits (Jain), vol. iv, pp. 608 ff; Cosmogony and Cosmology (Indian), 4, vol. iv. p. 160 f., and Ages of the World (Indian), vol. i. p. 200.

tances of elements which collectively make up an individual existence, e. g. the peculiar body with its general and special qualities, faculties, etc.; (7) *gotra*, that which determines the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., of an individual; (8) *antarāya*, that which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and thereby prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it.

Each kind of *karma* has its predestined limits in time within which it must take effect and thereby be purged off. Before we deal with the operation of karma, however, we must mention another doctrine which is connected with the *karm*-theory, viz. that of the six *leśyās*. The totality of *karma* amalgamated by a soul induces on it a transcendental colour, a kind of complexion, which cannot be perceived by our eyes; and this is called *leśyā*. There are six *leśyās*: black, blue, grey; yellow, red, and white. They have also, and prominently, a moral bearing; for the *leśyā* indicates the charater of the individual who owns it. The first three belong to bad characters, the last three to good characters.[30]

The individual state of the soul is produced by its inborn nature and karma with which it is vitiated; this is the developmental or *pāriṇāmika* state. But there are 4 other states which have

30 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) ordinary cognition (*mati*), (2) testimony (*śruta*), (3) supernatural cognition (*avadhi*), (4) direct knowledge of the thoughts of others (*manaḥparyaya*), (5) omniscience (*kevala*).

reference only to the behaviour of the *karma*. In the common course of things *karma* takes effect and produces its proper results; then the soul is in the *audayika* state. By proper efforts *karma* may be prevented, for some time, from taking effect; it is neutralized (*upaśamita*), but it is still present, just like fire covered by ashes; then the soul is in the *aupaśamika* state. When *karma* is not only prevented from operating, but is annihilated altogether (*kṣapita*), then the soul is in the *kṣāyika* state, which is necessary for reaching *nirvāṇa*. There is a fourth state of the soul, *kṣāyopaśamika*, which partakes of the nature of the preceding ones; in this state some *karma* is annihilated, some is neutralized, and some is active. This is the state of ordinary good men, but the *kṣāyika* and *aupaśamika* states belong to holy men, especially the former. It will be easily understood that these distinctions have an important moral bearing; they are constantly referred to in the practical ethics of the Jains.

We shall now consider the application of the *karma*-theory to ethics. The highest goal is to get rid of all *karma* (*nirjarā*) and meanwhile to acquire no new *karma*-technically speaking, to stop the influx (*āsrava*) of *karma*, which is called *saṁvara*, or the covering of the channels through which *karma* finds entrance into the soul. All actions produce *karma*, and in the majority of cases entail on the doer continuance of worldly existence (*sāmparāyika*); but, when a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance

with the rules of right conduct, his actions produce *karma* which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated (*īryāpatha*). Therefore the whole apparatus of monastic conduct is required to prevent the formation of new *karma*; the same purpose is served by austerities (*tapas*), which, moreover, annihilate the old *karma* more speedily than would happen in the common course of things.

It is evident from the preceding remarks that the ethics and ascetics of the Jains are to be regarded as the logical consequence of the theory of *karma*. But from a historical point of view many of their ethical principles, monastic institutions, and ascetic practices have been inherited from older religious classes of Indian society, since Brahmanical ascetics and Buddhists resemble them in many of their precepts and institutions (see SBE xxii. (1884) Introd. p. xxii ff.).

ii. Jain ethics has for its end the realization of *nirvāṇa*, or *mokṣa*. The necessary condition for reaching this end is the possession of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. These three excellences are metaphorically named the 'three jewels' (*triratna*), an expression used also by the Buddhist, but in a different sense; they are not produced, but they are manifested on the removal of obstructing or obscuring species of *karma*. To effect this, the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. Of first importance are the five vows, the first four of which are also acknowledged by Brāhmans and Buddhists. The five vows (*vratas*) of the Jains are: (1) not to kill; (2) not to lie; (3) not to steal;

(4) to abstain from sexual intercourse; (5) to renounce all interest in worldly things, especially to keep no property. These vows are to be strictly observed by monks, who take them on entering the Order, or, as it is commonly expressed, on taking *dīkṣā*. In their case the vows are called the five great vows (*mahāvrata*). Lay people, however, should observe these vows so far as their conditions admit; the five vows of the lay people are called the small vows (*aṇuvrata*). To explain: not to kill any living beings requires the greatest caution in all actions, considering that nearly everything is believed to be endowed with life. Endless rules have been laid down for monks which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living beings whatever. But if a layman were to observe these rules he could not go about his business; he is, therefore, obliged to refrain only from intentionally killing living beings, be it for food, pleasure, gain, or any such purpose. And so it is also with the remaining vows; their rigour is somewhat abated in the case of laymen. A layman, however, may, for a limited time, follow a more rigorous practice by taking one of the following particular vows or regulations of conduct (*sīlavrata*); (1) *digvirati*; he may limit the distance up to which he will go in this or that direction; (2) *anarthadaṇḍavirati*; he may abstain from engaging in anything that does not strictly concern him; (3) *upabhogaparibhogaparimāṇa*; he may set a measure to his food, drink, and the things he enjoys, avoiding besides gross enjoyments. (It may be mentioned in passing that certain articles of food, etc., are strictly forbidden to all, monks and

laymen alike, e. g. roots, honey, and spirits and likewise no food may be eaten at night.). The preceding three vows are called *guṇavrata*; the next four are the disciplinary vows (*śikṣāvrata*): (4) *deśavirata*, reducing the area in which one will move; (5) *sāmāyika*; by this vow the layman undertakes to give up, at stated times, all sinful actions by sitting down motionless and meditating on holy things; (6) *pauṣadhopavāsa*, to live as a monk on the 8th, 14th, or 15th, or day of the lunar fortnight, at least once a month: (7) *atithisaṁvibhāga*, lit. to give a share to guests, but it is understood in a less literal sense, viz., to provide the monks with what they want.

Most of these regulations of conduct for laymen are intended apparently to make them participate, in a measure and for some time, in the merits and benefits of monastic life without obliging them to renounce the world altogether. The rules for a voluntary death have a similar end in view. It is evident that the lay part of the community were not regarded as outsiders, or only as friends and patrons of the Order, as seems to have been the case in early Buddhism; their position was, from the beginning, well defined by religious duties and privileges; the bond which united them to the Order of monks was an effective one. The state of a layman was one preliminary and, in many cases, preparatory to the state of a monk; in the latter respect, however, a change seems to have come about, in so far as now and for some time past the Order of monks is recruited chiefly from novices entering it at an early age, not from laymen in

general. It cannot be doubted that this close union between laymen and monks brought about by the similarity of their religious duties, differing not in kind, but in degree, has enabled Jainism to avoid fundamental changes within, and to resist dangers from without for more than two thousand years, while Buddhism, being less exacting as regards the laymen, underwent the most extraordinary evolutions and finally disappeared in the country of its origin.

A monk on entering the Order takes the five great vows stated above; if they are strictly kept, in the spirit of the five times five clauses, or *bhāvanās* (SBE xxii. 202 ff.), no new *karma* can form. But, to practise them effectually, more explicit regulations are required, and these constitute the discipline of the monks. This discipline is described under seven heads.

(1) Since through the activity of body, speech, and mind, which is technically called *yoga* by the Jains, *karma*-matter pours into the soul (*āsrava*) and forms new *karma*, as explained above, it is necessary, in order to prevent the *āsrava* (or to effect *saṁvara*), to regulate those activities by keeping body, speech, and mind in strict control: these are the three *guptis* (e. g., the *gupti* or guarding of the mind consists in not thinking or desiring anything bad; having only good thoughts, etc.). (2) Even in those actions which are inseparable from the duties of a monk, he may become guilty of sin by inadvertently transgressing the great vows (e. g., killing living beings). To avoid such sins he must observe

the five *samitis, i. e.* he must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body; *e. g.*, a monk should in walking look before him for about six feet of ground to avoid killing or hurting any living being; he should, for the same reason, inspect and sweep the ground before he puts anything on it; he should be careful not to eat anything considered to possess life,[31] etc. (3) Passion being the cause of the amalgamation of *karma*-matter with the soul, the monk should acquire virtues. The 4 cardinal vices (*kaṣāya*) are anger, pride, illusion, and greed; their opposite virtues are forbearance, indulgence, straightforwardness, and purity. Adding to them the following 6 virtues, veracity, restraint, austerities, freedom from attachment to anything, poverty and chastity, we have what is called the tenfold highest law of the monks (*uttamadharma*). (4) Helpful for the realization of the sanctity of which an earnest searcher of the highest good stands in need are the 12 reflexions (*anuprekṣā* or *bhāvanā*) on the transitoriness of all things, on the helplessness of men, on the misery of the world, and similar topics, which form the subject of endless homilies inserted in their works by Jain authors. (5) Furthermore, it is necessary for a monk, in order to keep in

31 The belief in colours of the soul seems to be very old and to go back to the time when expressions like 'a black soul', 'a bright soul', were understood in a literal sense. Traces of a similar belief have also been found elsewhere (see *Mahābhārata*, xii. 280. 33 f., 291. 4 ff; cf. *Yogasūtra*, iv. 7).

the right path to perfection and to annihilate his *karma*, to bear cheerfully with all that may cause him trouble or annoyance. There are 22 such 'troubles' (*parīṣaha*) which a monk must endure without flinching, as hunger and thirst, cold and heat, all sorts of trying occurrences, illness, ill treatment, emotions, etc. If we consider that the conduct of the monk is regulated with the purpose of denying him every form of comfort and merely keeping him alive, without, however, the risk of hurting any living beings, it may be imagined to what practical consequences the endurance of the *parīṣahas* must lead. (6) Conduct (*chāritra*) consists in control and is of 5 degrees or phases. In the lowest phase all sinful activities are avoided, and the highest leads to the annihilition of all karma, preliminary to final liberation. (7) The last item is asceticism or austerities (*tapas*), which not only prevents the forming of new *karma* (*saṁvara*) but also purges off the old (*nirjarā*) provided that it be undertaken in the 'austerities of fools' (*bālatapas*) practised by other religious sects, through which temporary merits, such as supernatural powers, birth as a god, etc., can be accomplished but the highest good will never be attained. *Tapas* is, therefore, one of the most important institutions of Jainism. It is divided into (*A*) external and (*B*) internal *tapas*; the former comprises the austerities practied by the Jains, the latter their spiritual exercises. (*A*) Among austerities fasting is the most conspicuous; the Jains have developed it to a kind of art, and reach a remarkable proficiency in it. The usual way of fasting is to

eat only one meal every second, third, fourth day, and so on down to half a year. Another form of fasting is starving oneself to death *maraṇāntiki saṁlekhanā*.[27a] Other kinds of abstinence are distinguished from fasting properly so called; reduction of the quantity of the daily food; restrictions as regards the kind of food selected from what one has obtaind by begging (for monks and nuns must, of course, beg their daily meal and must not eat what has been specially prepared for them); rejection of all attractive food. To the category of external austerities belong also sitting in secluded spots to meditate there and the postures taken up during meditation. The latter item Jain ascetics have in common with Brāhmanical Yoga. (*B*) Internal austerities embrace all that belongs to spiritual discipline, including contemplation–e. g., confessing and repenting of sins. Transgressions of the rules of conduct are daily expiated by the ceremony of *pratikramaṇa;* greater sins must be confessed to a superior (*ālochanā*) and repented of. The usual penance in less serious cases is to stand erect in a certain position for a given time (*kāyotsarga*); but for graver transgressions the superior prescribes other penances—in the worst cases a new ordination of the guilty monk. Other kinds of internal austerities consist in modest behaviour, in doing services to other members of the Order or laymen, in the duty of studying, in overcoming all temptations. But the most

27a) See 'Voluntary death or euthanasia', in the art. Death and Disposal of the Dead (Jain) ERE.

important of all spiritual exercises is contemplation (*dhyāna*). Contemplation consists in the concentration of the mind on one object; it cannot be persevered in for longer than one *muhūrta* (48 minutes), and is permitted only to persons of a sound constitution. According to the object on which the thoughts are concentrated and the purpose for which this is done, contemplation may be bad or good, and will lead to corresponding results. We are here concerned only with good contemplation, which is either religious (*dharma*), or pure or bright (*śukla*). The former leads to the intuitive cognition of things hidden to common mortals, especially of religious truths. Indeed, it cannot be doubted that the pretended accuracy of information on all sorts of subjects, such as cosmography, astronomy, geography, spiritual processes, etc., which the sacred books and later treatises contain is in great part due to the intuition which the 'religious contemplation' is imagined to produce. Higher than the latter is the 'pure' contemplation, which leads through four stages to final emancipation: first, single objects are meditated upon, then only one object; then there is the stage when the activities of the body, speech, and mind continue, but only in a subtle form without relapse. At this stage, when the worldly existence rapidly draws towards its end the remaining *karma* may be suddenly consumed by a kind of explosion called *samudghāta*. Then, in the last stage of contemplation, all *karma* being annihilated and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for

ever. It must, however, be remarked that 'pure contemplation is not by itself a means of reaching liberation, but that it is the last link of a long chain of preparatory exertions. Even its first two stages can be realized only by those in whom the passions (*kaṣāya*) are either neutralized or annihilated; and only *kevalins*, *i. e.* those who have already reached omniscience, can enter into the last two stages, which lead directly to liberation. On the other hand, the *nirvāṇa* is necessarily preceded by 12 years of self-mortification of the flesh[28], which should be the closing act of a monk's career, though it no longer leads to liberation, for Jambūsvāmin, the disciple of Mahāvīra's disciple Sudharman, was the last man who reached *kevala*, or omniscience, and was liberated on his death[29] (64 after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa); accordingly during the rest of the present Avasarpiṇī period nobody will be born who reaches *nirvāṇa* in the same existence. Nevertheless these speculations possess a great theoretical interest, because they afford us a deeper insight into the Jain system.

In this connexion we must notice a doctrine to which the Jains attach much importance, viz. the doctrine of the 14 *guṇasthānas*, *i. e.* the 14 steps which, by a gradual increase of good qualities and decrease of *karma*, lead from total ignorance and wrong belief to absolute purity of the soul and final liberation.

28 See Death and Disposal of the Dead (Jain), ERE vol. iv. p. 484.

29 Pariśiṣṭa Parvan, iv. 50 ff.

In the first stage (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) are all beings from the *nigodas* upwards to those men who do not know or do not believe in the truths revealed by the Tīrthakaras; they are swayed by the two cardinal passions, love and hate (*rāga* and *dveṣa*), and are completely tied down by *karma*. In the following stages, as one advances by degrees in true knowledge, in firmness of belief, and in the control and repression of passions, different kinds of *karma* are got rid of and their effects cease, so that the being in question becomes purer and purer in each following stage. In all stages up to the 11th (that of a *upaśāntakaṣāyavītarāgachchhadmastha*) a relapse may take place and a man may fall even down to the first stage. But as soon as he has reached the 12th stage, in which the first four kinds of *karma* are annihilated (that of a *kṣīṇakaṣāyavītarāgachchhadmastha*), he cannot but pass through the last two stages, in which omniscience is reached; in the 13th stage (that of a *sayogikevalin*) the man still belongs to the world, and may continue in it for a long period; he retains some activities of body, speech, and mind; but, when all his activities cease, he enters on the last stage (that of an *ayogikevalin*), which leads immediately to liberation, when the last remnant of *karma* has been annihilated.

A question must now be answered which will present itself to every critical reader, viz. Is the karma-theory as explained above an original and integral part of the Jain system? It seems so abstruse and highly artificial that one would readily believe it a later developed metaphysical doctrine

which was grafted on an originally religious system based on animistic notions and intent on sparing all living beings: But such a hypothesis would be in conflict with the fact that this *karma*-theory, if not in all details, certainly in the main outlines, is acknowledged in the oldest parts of the canon and presupposed by many expressions and technical terms occurring in them. Nor can we assume that in this regard the canonical books represent a later dogmatic development for the following reason; the terms *āsrava, saṁvara, nirjarā*, etc., can be understood only on the supposition that *karma* is a kind of subtle matter flowing or pouring into the soul (*āsrava*), that this influx can be stopped or its inlets covered (*saṁvara*), and that the *karma*-matter received into the soul is consumed or digested, as it were, by it (*nirjarā*). The Jains understand these terms in their literal meaning, and use them in explaining the way of salvation (the *saṁvara* of the *āsravas* and the *nirjarā* lead to *mokṣa*). Now these terms are as old as Jainism. For the Buddhists have borrowed from it the most significant term *āsrava*; they use it in very much the same sense as the Jains, but not in its literal meaning, since they do not regard the *karma* as subtle matter, and deny the existence of a soul into which the *karma* could have an 'influx'. Instead of *saṁvara* they say *āsavakkhaya* (*āsravakṣaya*), 'destruction of the *āsravas*', and identify it with *magga* (*mārga*, 'path'). It is obvious that with them *āśrava* has lost its literal meaning, and that, therefore, they must have borrowed this term from a sect where it had retained its original significance, or, in other

words, from the Jains. The Buddhists also use the term *saṁvara*, e. g. *sīlasaṁvara*, 'restraint under the moral law', and the participle *saṁvuta*, 'controlled', words which are not used in this sense by Brāhmanical writers, and therefore are most probably adopted from Jainism, where in their literal sense they adequately express the idea that they denote. Thus the same argument serves to prove at the same time that the *karma*-theory of the Jains is an original and integral part of their system, and that Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism.

5. PRESENT STATE OF JAINISM.

The Jains, both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, number, according to the census of 1901, 1, 334, 140 members, *i.* e. even less than 1/2 per cent of the whole population of India.[30] On account of their wealth and education the Jains are of greater importance, however, than might be expected from their number. There are communities of Jains in most towns all over India. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India, in Maisūr and Kannaḍa, but also in the North, in the North-Western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna, and the Panjāb. The headquarters of the Śvetāmbaras are in Gujarāt (whence Gujaratī has become the common language of the Śvetāmbaras, rather than Hindī) and Western Rājputāna, but they are to be found also all

30 The small number of Jains is explained by the fact that Jainism is not a religion of the uncultivated masses, but rather of the upper classes.

over Northern and Central India. Very much the same distribution of the Jains as at present seems, from the evidence of the inscriptions, to have prevailed ever since the 4th century.[31] Splendid temples bear testimony to the wealth and zeal of the sect, some of which rank among the architectural wonders of India, as those on the hills of Girnār and Śatruñjaya, on Mount Ābū, in Ellora, and elsewhere.

The outfit of a monk is restricted to bare necessities, and these he must beg: clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it. The nuns' outfit is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep on clothes and use peacocks' feathers instead of the broom. The monks shave the head, or remove the hair by plucking it out (*locha*). The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred and is necessary at particular times; it is peculiar to the Jains and is regarded by them as essential rite.

Originally, the monks had to lead a wandering life except during the monsoon, when they stayed in one place; compare the *vassa* of the Buddhist monks. Thus Mahāvīra in his wandering stayed for one day only in a village and five days in a town. But this habit has been somewhat changed by the introduction of convents (*upāśraya*), corresponding to the *vihāras* of the Buddhists.

31 See Guérinot, Repertoire d'epigraphie Jaina, p. 24.

The *upāśrayas* 'are separate buildings erected by each sect for their monks or nuns. An Upās'raya is a large bare hall without bath-rooms and cooking places, furnished only with wooden beds' (M. Stevenson, Mod. Jainism, p. 38).

The Śvetāmbaras, as a rule, go only to those places where there are such *upāśrayas;* and now they stay as long as a week in a village, in a town as long as a month. It is in the *upāśraya* that the monks preach or explain sacred texts to laymen who come to visit them. The daily duties of a monk are rather arduous if conscientiously performed; e. g., he should sleep only three hours of the night. His duties consist in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), careful inspection of his clothes and other things for the removal of insects, for cleaning them, etc. (for details see lect. xxvi. of the *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* (SBE XLV. 142 ff.)). There are various monastic degrees. First there is the novice (*śaikṣa*), who is not yet ordained. When he or any other man takes the vows (*vratādāna*), he renounces the world (*pravrajyā*) and initiated or takes *dīkṣā*. The most important ceremony at that time is the shaving or pulling out of the hair under a tree. From a common monk he may rise to the rank of a teacher and superior called *upādhyāya, āchārya, vāchaka, gaṇin*, etc. according to degrees and occupations.

The religious duties of the laity have, to some extent, been treated above. The ideal of conduct is that of the monk, which a layman, of course,

cannot realize, but which he tries to approach by taking upon himself particular vows.[32] But in practical life also, apart from asceticism, the Jains possess a body of rules composed by monks which lay out a rational course of life for laymen and tend to improve their welfare and moral standard.[33] The monks have also to provide for the religious wants of the laity by explaining sacred texts or religious treatises and delivering sermons; this is done in the *upāśrayas* where the laymen visit them; similarly the nuns are visited by, or visit, the lay women. But the most conspicuous habit of the laity is attendance in temples, and worship of the Tirthakaras and the deities associated with them.[34]

We must now advert to a peculiarity of the Jains which has struck all observers more than any other, viz. their extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being, a principle which is carried out to its very last consequences in mona-

32 Mention should be made of the 11 *paḍimās* (Skr. *pratimā*), or standards of ascetic life, which a layman may take upon himself especially when he intends to end his life by starving (cf. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 45, n. 12 f., *IA* xxxiii. (1904) 330).

33 E. Windisch, *Yogaśāstra*, Germ. tr., *ZDMG* xxviii. (1874); L. Suali, *Yogabindu*, Ital. tr., *Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana*, xxi. (1908); Warren, *Jainism*, p. 64 ff.

34 For a description of the worship of the different sections of the Jains see Stevenson, *Mod. Jainism*, p. 85 ff., where there is also a short notice of the Jain festivals and fasts (p. 107 ff.; cf. also art. Festivals and Fasts (Jain), ERE. vol. v, p. 875 ff.).

stic life, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even any insect, however troublesome; he will remove it carefully without hurting it. It goes without saying that the Jains are strict vegetarians. This principle of not hurting any living being bars them from some professions, e. g. agriculture, and 'has thrust them into commerce, and especially into its least elevating branch of money-lending. Most of the money-lending in Western India is in the hands of the Jains, and this accounts in a great measure both for their unpopularity and for their wealth.'[35] A remarkable institution of the Jains, due to their tender regard for animal life, is their asylums for old and diseased animals, the *pāñjarāpolas*, where they are kept and fed till they die a natural death.

6. History of Jainism.

The history of the Jain church, in both the Svetāmbara and the Digambara sections, is chiefly contained in their lists of patriarchs and teachers and in legends concerning them. The oldest list of patriarchs of the Śvetāmbaras is the *Sthavirāvali* in the *Kalpasūtra*, which begins with Mahāvīra's disciple Sudharman and ends with the 33rd patriarch Śāṇḍilya or Skandila. Of most patriarchs only the names and the *gotra* are given; but there is also an expanded list from the 6th, Bhadrabāhu, down to the 14th, Vajrasena, which adds more details, viz. the names of the disciples of each patriarch and of the schools and branches (*gaṇa*,

35 Stevenson, 41.

kula, and *śākhā* founded by, or orginating with, them. As some of these details are also mentioned in old Jain inscriptions of the 2nd cent. *A. D.* found at Mathurā,[36] this part at least of the Jain tradition is proved to be based on historical facts. Further, the more detailed list of patriarchs shows that after the 6th patriarch a great expansion of Jainism took place in the N. and N. W. of India.[37] Beyond the details mentioned, we have no historical records about the patriarchs; but such legends as were known about them down to Vajrasena have been combined in Hemachandra's *Pariśiṣṭa Parvan* into a kind of continuous narrative.[38] For later times there are lists of teachers (*gurvāvali, paṭṭāvali*)[39] of separate schools, called *gachchha* which give a summary account from Mahāvīra down to the founder of the *gachchha* in question, and then a more detailed one of the line of descent from the latter downward, with some particulars of subsequent heads of the *gachchha* called Srīpūjya. The number of *gachchhas*,

36 See Bühler, Epigr. Ind. i. (1892) 371 ff., 393 ff.

37 It is, however, curious that another tradition states: 'In India after the time of the Nanda kings the Law of the Jinas will become scarce' (*Paümachariya*, lxxxix. 42). Perhaps this refers more specially to Magadha and the adjoining countries, where, under the reign of the Mauryas, Buddhism soon attained the position of a popular religion, and must have become a formidable rival of Jainism.

38 See the contents of the work given in the introduction to the text in the Bibl. Ind. edition.

39 The oldest *gurvāvali* known is that by Munisundara, A. D. 1410, ed. Benares, 1905.

which usually differ only in minute details of conduct, is said to amount to 84, of which only 8 are represented in Gujarāt, the most important of them being the Kharatara Gachchha, which has split into many minor gachchhas, the Tapā, Añchala, and others. Separate mention is due to the Upakeśa Gachchha, whose members are known as ahe Oswāl Jains; they are remarkable for beginning their desent, not from Mahāvira, but from his predecessor Pārśva. These lists of teachers seem, as a rule, to be reliable only in that part which comes after the founder of the school to which they belong; the preceding period down to about the 9th cent. A. D. is one of great uncertainty: there seems to be a chronological blank of three centuries somewhere.[40]

Records which allude to contemporaneous secular history are scant; such as we have in inscriptions and legends refer to kings who had favoured the Jains or were believed to have embraced Jainism. The first patron king of the Jains is said to have been Samprati, grandson of the great emperor Aśoka; but this is very doubtful history. A historical fact of the greatest importance for the history of Jainism was the conversion of Kumārapāla, king of Gujarāt, by Hemachandra.

Finally, we must mention the schisms (*nihnava*) that have occurred in the Jain church. According to the Śvetāmbaras, there were eight schisms, of

40 A full bibliography of this subject is contained in Guérinot, *Essai de bibliographie jaina*, p. 370 ff., and *Répertoire d'epigraphie jaina* ...

which the first was originated by Mahāvīra's son-in-law, Jamāli; and eighth, occurring in 609 A. V, or A. D. 83, gave rise to the Digambara sect.[41] But the Digambaras seem to be ignorant of the earlier schisms; they say that under Bhadrabāhu rose the sect of Ardhaphālakas, which in A. D. 80 developed into the Śvetāmbara sect.[42] It is probable that the separation of the sections of the Jain church took place gradually, an individual development going on in both groups living at a great distance from one another, and that they became aware of their mutual difference about the end of the 1st cent. A. D. But the difference is small in articles of faith (see art. Digambara).

The sources for the history of the Digambaras are of a similar kind to those of the Śvetāmbaras, but later in date. The Digambara line of patriarchs is quite distinct from that of their rivals, except that they agree in the names of the first patriarch, Jambū, and the 6th, Bhadrabāhu, who, according to the Digambaras, emigrated at the head of the true monks towards the South. From Bhadrabāhu dates the gradual loss of their sacred literature, as stated above. The inscriptions furnish ample materials for a necessarily incomplete history of their ancient schools (*gaṇas*); but they do not quite agree in all details with the more modern tradition of the *paṭṭāvalis*. According to the latter, the main church (*mūla-saṅgha*) divided

41 See E. Leumann, in Ind. Studien, xvii. (1885) 91 ff.

42 See ZDMG xxxviii. (1884) 1 ff.

into four *gaṇas*, Nandi, Sena, Siṁha, and Deva, about the end of the 1st cent, A. D.

Literature.–Some of the more important works and treatises have been cited in the art.; a full bibliography has been given by A. Guérinot, *Essai de bibliographie jaina*, Paris, 1907, to which the reader is referred for all questions of detail. Of new monographs on the subject (besides the old one by G. Bühler, *Uber die indische secte der Jainas*, Vienna, 1887, tr. J. Burgess, London, 1903) the following will be found useful; Margaret Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910; Herbert Warren, *Jainism, in Western Garb, as a Solution to Life's great Problems*, Madras, 1912; H. L. Jhaveri, *The First Principles of the Jain Philosophy*, London, 1910. For translations of some of the principal texts see H. Jacobi, '*Jaina Sūtras*,' SBE xxii., XLV. (1884, 1895).



The Metaphysics and Ethics of The Jainas.

All who approach Jain philosophy will be under the impression that it is a mass of philosophical tenets not upheld by one central idea, and they will wonder what could have given currency to what appears to us an unsystematical system. I myself have held, and given expression to, this opinion, but I have now learned to look at Jain philosophy in a different light. It has, I think, a metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it a distinct position apart from the rival systems both of the Brahmans and of the Buddhists. This is the subject on which I would engage your attention for a short space of time.

Jainism, at least in its final form, which was given it by its last prophet the twenty-fourth Tīrthakara Mahāvīra, took its rise, as is well known, in that part of Eastern India where in an earlier period, according to the Upaniṣads, Yājñavalkya had taught the doctrine of Brahman and Ātman, as the permanent and absolute Being, and where Mahāvīra's contemporary and rival, Gotama the Buddha, was preaching his Law, which insisted on the transitoriness of all things. Jainism, therefore, had to take a definite position with refernce to each of these mutually exclusive doctrines; and these it will be necessary to define more explicitly.

The one great Truth which the authors of the Upaniṣads thought to have discovered, and which they are never weary of exalting, is that, underlying and upholding from within all things, physical as well as psychical, there is one absolute permanent Being, without change and with none other like it. The relation between this absolute Being and existent matter has not clearly been made out by the authors of the Upaniṣads, but all unprejudiced readers will agree that they looked on the phenomenal world as real. On this point the different schools of Vedāntins arrived at different conclusions, which, however, need not detain us here.

In opposition to this Brahmanical doctrine of absolute and permanent Being, Buddha taught that all things are transitory; indeed his dying words were, that all things that are produced must perish. The principal heresy, according to the Buddhists, is the *Ātmavāda*, i. e. the belief that permanent Being is at the bottom of all things; they are, as we should say, but phenomena, or as Buddha expressed it, *dharmas;* there is no *dharmin,* no permanent substance of which the dharmas could be said to be attributes.

Thus the Brahmans and the Buddhists entertained opposite opinions on the problem of Being because they approached it from two different points of view. The Brahmans exclusively followed the dictates of pure reason which forces us to regard Being as permanent, absolute, and uniform; the Buddhists, on the other hand, were just as one-sided in following the teaching of common

experience according to which existence is but a succession of originating and perishing. Either view, the *a priori* view of the Brahmans, and the *a posteriori* view of the Buddhists, is beset with many difficulties when we are called upon to employ it in explanation of the state of things as presented to us by our consciousness; difficulties which cannot be overcome without a strong faith in the paramount truth of the principle adopted.

The position taken by the Jainas towards the problem of Being is as follows. Being, they contend, is joined to production, continuation, and destruction (*sad utpāda-dhrauvya-vināśayuktam*), and they call their theory the theory of indefiniteness (*anekāntavāda*), in contradistinction to the theory of permanency (*nityavāda*) of the Vedāntists, and to the theory of transitoriness (*vināśavāda*) of the Buddhists. Their opinion comes to this. Existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter; which matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

The Jain theory of Being appears thus to be merely the statement of the common-sense view, and it would be hard to believe that great importance was attached to it. Still it is regarded as the metaphysical basis of their philosophy. Its significance comes out more clearly when we regard it in relation to the doctrines of *Syādvāda*, and of the *Nayas*.

Syādvāda is frequently used as a synonym of *Jainapravacana* (e. g. at a later date in the title of a well-known exposition of the Jain philosophy entitled *Syādvāda-Mañjarī*): and it is much boasted of as the saving truth leading out of the labyrinth of sophisms. The idea underlying the *Syādvāda* is briefly this. Since the nature of Being is intrinsically indefinite and made up of the contradictory attributes of originating, continuance, and perishing, any proposition about an existing thing must, somehow, reflect the indefiniteness of Being, i.e. any metaphysical proposition is right from one point of view, and the contrary proposition is also right from another. There are, according to this doctrine, seven forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word *syāt* e. g. *syād asti sarvam, syād nāsti sarvam. Syāt* means 'may be', and is explained by *kathaṃcit*, which in this connexion may be translated 'somehow'. The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti*, and indicates the indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam*). For example, we say, a jar is somehow, i. e. it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow, if we mean thereby that it exists as a cloth or the like.

The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption made by the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (*asti*) and 'is not' (*nāsti*). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*); for existent and non-existent (*sat* and *asat*) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a coexistence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot

be expressed by any word in the language. These three predicates variously combined make up the seven propositions or *saptabhangas* of the Syādvāda. I shall not abuse your patience by discussing this doctrine at length; it is enough to have shown that it is an outcome of the theory of indefiniteness of Being (*anekāntavāda*), and to have reminded you that the Jainas believe the Syādvāda to be the key to the solution of all metaphysical questions.

The doctrine of the Nayas which I mentioned before is, as it were, the logical complement to the Syādvāda. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things; all these ways of judgement are, according to the Jainas, one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are seven nayas, four referring to concepts, and theree to words. The reason for this variety is that Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins believe, but is of a complicated nature; therefore, every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we need must go astray.

There is nothing in all this which sounds deeply speculative; on the contrary, the Jain theory of Being seems to be a vindication of common-sense against the paradoxical speculations of the Upaniṣads. It is also, but not primarily, directed against the Buddhistic tenet of the transitoriness of all that exists. We cannot, however, say that it expressly and consciously combats the Buddhistic view, or that it was formulated in order to combat it. And this

agrees well with the historical facts, that Mahāvīra came long after the original Upaniṣads, but was a contemporary of Bnddha. He was obliged, therefore, to frame his system so as to exclude the principles of Brahmanical speculation, but his position was a different one with regard to the newly proclaimed system of Buddha.

I have not yet touched on the relation between Jain philosophy on the one hand and Sānkhya Yoga on the other. We may expect a greater community of ideas between these systems, since both originated in the same class of religious men, viz. the ascetics known as the Śramaṇas, or, to use the more modern term, Yogins. As regards the practice of asceticism, the methods and the aim of Yoga, it has long been proved that the Yoga of Brahmans, Jainas, ond Bauddhas are closely related to each other, and there can be no doubt that they have all developed from the same source. But I am now concerned only with those philosophical ideas which have a connexion with ascetic practice and form the justification thereof.

Now the Sānkhya view as to the problem of Being is clearly a kind of compromise between the theory of the Upaniṣads and what we may call the common-sense view. The Sānkhyas adopt the former with regard to the souls or *puruṣas* which are permanent and without change. They adopt the latter when assigning to matter or Prakṛti its character of unceasing change. The Sānkhyas contend that all things besides the souls or *puruṣas* are products of the one Prakṛti or primaeval matter, and similarly the Jainas teach that practically all things besides the souls or *jīvas* are made

up of matter or *pudgala*, which is of only one kind and is able to develop into everything. It will thus be seen that the Sānkhyas and Jainas are at one with regard to the nature of matter; in their opinion matter is something which may become anything. This opinion, it may be remarked, seems to be the most primitive one; not only was it entertained by the ancients, but also it underlies the universal belief of transformation occurring in the natural course of things or produced by sorcery and spells. This is a point I wish to make, that the Sānkhyas and Jainas started from the same conception of matter, but worked it out on different lines. The Sāṅkhyas teach that the products of Prakṛti are evolved in a fixed order, from the most subtle and spiritual one (*Buddhi*) down to the gross elements, and their order is always reproduced in the successive creations and dissolutions of the world. The Jainas, on the other hand, do not admit such a fixed order of development of matter (*pudgala*), but believe that the universe is eternal and of a permanent structure. According to them matter is atomic, and all material changes are really going on in the atoms and their combinations. A curious feature of their atomic theory is that the atoms are either in a gross condition or in a subtle one, and that innumerable subtle atoms take up the space of one gross atom. The bearing of this theory on their psychology I shall now proceed to point out. But I must premise that the Jainas do not recognize a psychical apparatus of such a complex nature as the Sānkhyas in their tenet concerning Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas,

and the Indriyas. The Jaina opinion is much cruder, and comes briefly to this. According to the merit or demerit of a person, atoms of a peculiar subtle form, which we still call *karma* matter, invade his soul or *jīva*, filling and defiling it, and obstructing its innate faculties. The Jainas are quite out-spoken on this point, and explicitly say that *karman* is made up of matter, *paudgalikaṃ karma*. This must be understood literally, not as a metaphor, as will be seen from the following illustrations. The soul or *jīva* is extremely light, and by itself it has a tendency to move upwards (*ūrdhvagaurava*), but it is kept down by the karma matter with which it is filled. But when it is entirely purged of karma matter, at Nirvāṇa, it goes upwards in a straight line to the top of the universe, the domicile of the released souls. To take another example. The karma matter within a soul may assume different conditions. It may be turbulent, as mud in water which is being stirred; or it may be inactive, as mud in water when it has settled at the bottom of a basin; or it may be completely neutralized as when the clear water is poured off after the mud has been precipitated. Here again it is evident that karma is regarded as a substance or matter, though of an infinitely more subtle nature than the impurities of water referred to in the illustration. As a third instance I will refer to the six *Leśyās* or complexions of the souls, ranging from deepest black to shining white, colours which we common mortals cannot perceive with our eyes. This doctrine was shared also by the Ājīvikas, on whom

Dr. Hoernle[1] has thrown so much light.' These colours of the soul are produced on it by the karman which acts as a colouring substance. Here also the material nature of karman is quite obvious.

To return from this digression, the karma matter that enters the soul is transformed into eight different kinds of karman, about which I shall have to say a word presently. This change of the one substance into eight varieties of karma is likened to the transformation of food consumed at one meal into the several fluids of the body. The karma matter thus transformed and assimilated builds up a subtle body, which ingests the soul and accompanies it on all its transmigrations, till it enters Nirvāṇa and goes up to the top of the universe. This subtle body or *kārmaṇaśarīra* is obviously the Jain counterpart of the *sūkṣma-śarīra* or *lingaśarīra* of the Sānkhyas.[2] In order to understand the functions of this subtle body or kārmaṇaśarīra, we must take a summary view of the eight kinds of karman of which it is com-posed. The first and second (*jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya*) obstruct knowledge and faith, which are innate faculties of the soul or *jīva*; the third (*mohanīya* causes delusion, especially the affections and passions; the fourth (*vedanīya*) results in pleasure and pain; the fifth (*āyuṣka*) assigns the length of life to the person in his present birth; the sixth (*nāma*) furnishes him

1 *Encyclopaedea of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. i. pp. 259 sq.

2 The Jainas recognize four different subtle bodies; see Tattvārth., ii. 37 sq.

with all that belongs to him as an individual; the seventh (*gotra*) makes him a member of the class or genus he is to belong to; the eighth (*antarāya*) produces hindrances to the realization of his virtues and powers. Each of these eight kinds of karman endures for a certain period, of varying length, within which it must take its proper effect. Then it is expelled from the soul, a process which is called *nirjarā*. The opposite process, the influx of karman into the soul, is called *āsrava*, a term well known to students of Buddhism. The occasions for āsrava are the actions of the body and mind (*yoga*); they open as it were an inlet for karma matter to invade the soul. If that soul is in a state of iniquity, i. e. if the person under consideration does not possess right faith, or does not keep the commandments, or is careless in his conduct, or does not subdue his passions, then, in all these cases, singly or collectively, (*vrata*), or is careless in his conduct, or does not subdue his passions, then, in all these cases, singly or collectively, especially, under the influence of the passions, the soul must retain the karma matter, or, as the Jainas say, binds it (*bandha*). But the influx of karma matter or āsrava can be prevented; this is called the stopping or *saṃvara*.

These primitive notions the Jainas have worked out into a philosophical superstructure, which serves just as well as that of the Sānkhyas (but on different lines) to explain the problems of mundane existence and to teach way of salvation. In order to make this clear I must add a more details.

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Saṃvara is effected, i. e. the influx of karma is prevented by the observance of peculiar rules of conduct, by restraint of body, speech, and mind by strict morality, by religious reflections, by indifference to things pleasant or unpleasant, etc. The most effective means, however, is the practice of austerities (*tapas*), which has this advantage over the other means, that it not only prevents karma from accumulating, but also consumes the accumulated karma. Tapas, therefore, produces also nirjarā and leads to Nirvāna; it is the chief means of salvation, as might be expected in a religion of ascetics. The denotation of the word 'tapas' in Jainism is somewhat different from its usual meaning. There is tapas of the body (*bāhya tapas*) and tapas of the mind (*ābhyantara tapas*). The former consists in fasting, or eating scanty and tasteless food, in want of comfort and in mortification of the flesh. The mental tapas contains various items, as confession of sins and penance, monastic duties, obedience, modesty, self-restraint and meditation (*dhyāna*). I wish to lay stress on the fact that in the course of asceticism taught by the Jainas meditation is only one of many steps leading to the ultimate goal. Though Nirvāṇa is immediately preceded by the two purest stages of meditation, yet all other parts of tapas appear of equal importance. We shall see the signficance of this fact more clearly, when we compare the Jaina tapas with what corresponds to it in Sānkhya-Yoga. Their Yoga contains some of the varieties of Jaina tapas; but they are regarded as inferior to meditation or contemplation. Indeed the whole Yoga

centres in contemplation, all other ascetic practices are subordinate and subservient to contemplation—*dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. This is but natural in a system which makes the reaching of the *summum bonum* dependent on *jñāna*, knowledge. The theory of the evolution of Prakṛti, beginning with Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, appears, to my mind, to have been invented in order to explain the efficiency of contemplation for acquiring supernatural powers and for liberating the soul. Sānkhya-Yoga is a philosophical system of ascetics; but their asceticism has been much refined and has become spiritualized in a high degree. The asceticism of the Jainas is of a more original character; it chiefly aims at the purging of the soul from the impurities of karman. Jainism may have refined the asceticism then current in India; it certainly rejected many extravagances, such as the voluntary inflicting of pains; but it did not alter its character as a whole. It perpetuated an older or more original phase of asceticism than the Brahmanical Yoga, and carries us back to an older stratum of religious life in which we can still detect relics of primitive speculation in the shape of such crude notions as I have had occasion to mention in the course of my paper.

In conclusion I shall shortly touch on the third current of Indian philosophical speculation, viz. the philosophy of the Pandits which is represented to us by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. This philosophy may be characterized as an attempt to register, to define, and to arrange

in systematic order the concepts and general notions which are the common possession of all who spoke the Sanskrit language. Such a philosophy had some attraction for the Jainas who, as we have seen, always sided with common-sense views, and in fact many Jainas have written on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But at the time when the Jain system was framed, the Pandit, as we know him in later times, had probably not yet become distinguished from the Vedic scholar or theologian; it is almost certain that there was as yet no class of persons who could be called Pandits, and consequently their philosophy also was wanting. And the tradition of the Jainas themselves says as much; for according to them the Vaiśeṣika system was founded by Chaluya Rohagutta, originally a Jaina and pupil of Mahāgīri, eighth Sthavira after Mahāvīra. Thus we have no occasion to inquire into the relation between this system and Jainism. But it may be mentioned that the atomic theory which is a marked feature of the Vaiśeṣika, is already taught in outline by the Jainas. As regards the Nyāya system, it is almost certainly later than Jainism; for the dialectics and logic of the Jainas are of a very primitive character, and appear entirely unconnected with the greatly advanced doctrines of the Naiyāyikas.

In conclusion let me assert my conviction that Jainism is an original system, quite distinct and independent from all others; and that, therefore, it is of great importance for the study of philosophical thought and religious life in ancient India.

THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THOUGHT.

In the present paper I propose to investigate the development of philosophical ideas in ancient India at the time when Jainism entered on the scene. This enquiry is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the original concepts of Soul (*jīva*) and matter (*pudgala*) in the revealed literature of the Brahmans (*Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*) in contradiction to the ideas on the same subjects in Jainism and the classical philosophies (*darśana*), with which the second part will be concerned.

PART THE FIRST.

I. CHAPTER:-THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF SOUL.

1. All Indian philosophers with the exception of the Vedāntists of Śaṅkar's School (*māyāvādinah*) and the Buddhists, however much they may differ in details, agree in the main about the nature of Soul, viz. that is a permanent or eternal immaterial substance; they consequently maintain the personal immortality of the souls. To all who are accustomed to this belief it is difficult to realize that it is of a comparatively late origin. The primitive Aryans held a distinctly different opinion about the nature of the soul. Their belief may be described as follows. The life of man is continued after death in a form similar to what he

had been during his life on earth; it is but a shadowy existence, yet one in a bodily form, however subtle that body may have been imagined. This post-mortal body is the soul itself, there is no separate soul different from it. It will be convenient to call this principle of conscious life which is conceived under some bodily or material form, *psyche* instead of soul, and to use the term *soul* only to denote the immaterial and permanent substance which is possessed of intelligence and consciousness.

2. The primitive ideas of the Aryans about the psyche have been retained, to some extent, by the ancient Indians, and still linger on in the popular belief of the Hindus about the manes (*pitaraḥ*) which forms the basis of the *śrāddha* practice. For the *pitṛ-tarpaṇa* or oblation to the manes presupposes the belief that the manes stand in need of food and drink just like men; they must, therefore, have been imagined to be of an organisation not quite unlike that of men while living on earth. The psyche is frequently spoken of as a man (*puruṣa*) or rather manikin of thumb's size (*aṅguṣṭha mātra*); at the time of death it departs from the body which is then left behind as a corpse.

3. In the Brāhmaṇas and in the oldest Upaniṣads[1] we meet with very remarkable spe-

1 The oldest Upaniṣads are the following *Brahadāraṇyaka*, *Chhāndogya*, *Taittiriya*, *Aitareya*, and *Kauṣītakī*. After those Upaniṣads there is a decided break, and those which come nearest them, the *Kāṭhaka*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka*, etc belong to a new period as will be explained in the second part.

culations on the nature of the psyche which show a great advance over the primitive beliefs described above. In those works the psyche is spoken of as consisting in, or being made of several constituent parts which are frequently called *prāṇas*. They are regarded as the factors of physico-psychical life. Most usually five such factors are enumerated, viz. *prāṇa* breath, *vāc* speech, *chakṣuḥ* seeing or eye, *śrotra* hearing or ear, *manaḥ* mind. Occasionally more than five factors are mentioned, as in the passage to be quoted in the sequel; but the above set of five factors has, beyond doubt, been the almost generally accepted one. These psychical factors are not as many functions of, or qualities inherent in a common substratum, but they are distinct entities which combining form one individual psyche. They are, however, not quite independent or self-existent, for they stand in an intimate relation to the following physical or cosmical essences, taken in the same order: *vāyu* wind, *agni* fire, *āditya* sun, *diśaḥ* the heavenly quarters, *chandramaḥ* moon; and on the death of the individual man, they will eventually be reunited with the latter.

The Upaniṣads contain some discussions which throw full light on the theory of the psychical factors and make it quite clear that none of those factors was regarded as the permanent principle of personality, or, in other words, none of them could be claimed as the soul in the true meaning of word. In the 3rd Adhyāya of the *Bṛhad Araṇyaka* a great disputation under Janaka, King of Videha, is described, in which Yājñavalkya,

answers the questions put to him by the Brahmans of the Kurus and Pañcālas. In the 2nd Brāhmaṇa the opponent of Yājñavalkya is Jāratkārva Ārtabhāga. The problem under consideration is discussed in §§ 11–13, of which I quote the text and translation, the latter based on that of Max Müller in Sacred Books of the East. Vol. xv, p. 126 f. 11 'Yājñavalkya, he said, when such a person (a sage) dies, do the vital breaths (prāṇas) move out of him or no?' 'No', replied Yājñavalkya; 'they are gathered up in him, he is swelled, he is inflated, and thus inflated the dead lies at rest.' 12 'Yājñavalkya', he said, 'when such a man dies, what does not leave him?' 'The name', he replied, 'for the name is endless, the Viśvedevas are endless, and by it he gains the endless world.' 13 'Yājñavalkya', he said, when the speech of this dead person enters into the fire, breath into the wind, the eye into the sun, the mind into the moon, hearing into the quarters, into the earth the body, into the air (or space) the self, into the shrubs the hairs of the body, into the trees the hairs of the head, when the blood and the seed are deposited in the water, where is then that person?' Yājñavalkya said: 'Take my hand, my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this; let this question of ours not be (discussed) in public'. Then these two went out and argued, and what they said was Karman (work), and what they praised was Karman, viz., that a man becomes good by good work, and bad by bad work. After that Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga held his peace."

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियत उदस्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो३ नेति । नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्रैव समवनीयन्ते स उच्छ्वयत्याध्मायत्याध्मातो मृतः शेते ॥ ११ ॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते किमेनं न जहातीति । नामेति । अनन्तं वै नाम । अनन्ता विश्वे देवाः । अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति ॥ १२ ॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रास्य पुरुषस्याग्निं वागप्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यं मनश्चन्द्रं दिशः श्रोत्रं पृथिवीं शरीरमाकाशमात्मौषधीर्लोमानि वनस्पतीन्केशाः अप्सु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते । क्वायं तदा पुरुषो भवतीति । आहर सोम्य हस्तमार्तभागावामेतस्यैव वेदिष्यावो न नावेतत्सजन इति । तौ होत्क्रम्य मन्त्रयांचक्राते । तौ ह यदूचतुः । कर्म हैव तदूचतुरथ यत्प्रशशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत्प्रशशंसतुः । पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेनेति । ततो ह जारत्कारव आर्तभाग उपरराम ॥ १३ ॥

The purpose of the questioner in the foregoing passage of the *Bṛh. Ār.* is, as the reader will have remarked, to elicit from Yājñavalkya a declaration about the nature of Soul, for thereby he would be led on to explain its identity with Brahma. But this Yājñavalkya will not do, because his intention in the whole disputation is to prove that all the speculations of his opponents do not lead up to the true knowledge of Brahma. The first two paragraphs deal with the man who on dying reaches *moksha*. In § 11 Yājñavalkya declared that the *prāṇas* do not move out of him, but remain in the corpse; accordingly the *prāṇas* cannot be the Soul. The next question in § 12, what remains of such a man is answered evasively by Yājñavalkya. But his opponent is not to be put off easily; so he makes straight for the point: where is the *person* of a man, after his body has been dissolved into its elements and the constituent parts of his psyche have been reunited with their cosmical prototypes fire, wind, etc.? Yājñavalkya again avoids the declaration

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which his opponent seems to have expected, by referring to *karma*. They discuss the subject, in private, and therefore their view is not fully stated; but from the hints given in the text it must have come to this: the *karma* of a man who dies brings about a new set of *prāṇas* to start a new life, a good or a bad one according to the nature of the *karma* he had accumulated in his previous life. At any rate it is quite clear that both disputants assumed psychical life to be brought about by the combination and co-operation of the five *prāṇas*, and had no idea of any permanent substratum of man's personality. If such a belief, in immortal souls had been current at the time of the composition of *Bṛh. Ār.*, it would have come out in the course of the discussion, or rather it would have been absurd for the author to put into the mouth of Ārtabhāga the questions which he makes him ask. After all, the discussions as we read them in the *Bṛh. Ār.*, are not to be taken as historical records, but the whole disputation is an invention of the author after the model of a similar disputation on ritualistic items in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Therefore the general ideas embodied in this part of the Bṛh. Ār. also must be considered to belong to the common stock of ideas current during the Upanishad Period. I do not contend that the sages of that time did deny the existence of permanent souls, but that the very idea that there might be *immortal* souls had not yet entered their mind.

The same idea relative to soul comes out in teaching of the Upanishads that consciousness

ceases with death: *na pretya saṁjñāstīti* Bṛh. Ār. 2, 4, 13. 4, 5, 13. *saṁjñā* here means according to Śaṅkara *viśesha-saṁjñā* i. e. consciousness of ones' personality. This is no doubt the true meaning of *saṁjñā* in this passage; for *saṁjñā* has both meanings: 'consciousness' and 'individual name', which are here combined in Śaṅkara's rendering. The loss of self-consciousness is interpreted in another passage (Chhāndogya Upanishad, 6, 9, 1. 10, 1) by the merging of the individual being in Brahma. 'As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees, and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that tree, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True (either in sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in the true. In the next Khaṇḍa the same idea is illustrated by the simile of rivers and the ocean. (यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृतो निस्तिष्ठन्ति नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणां रसान् समवहारमेकतां रसं गमयन्ति । ते यथा तत्र न विवेकं लभन्तेऽमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्यमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मीत्येवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति). These similes illustrate unmistakably the loss of conscious personality in death, which indeed could be the consequence from the absence of any permanent substratum of it. Now all words and expressions in the Upanishads which might be used to denote the concept of Soul, can be proved not to denote the immortal Soul in our sense of the word. But it is not necessary here to enter in these details; we are here concerned with the main issue only viz. that the

concept of immortal souls is entirely absent in the Brāhmaṇas and the oldest Upanishads.

2. CHAPTER:-ORIGINAL NON-DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER.

From what has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter we are led to conclude that the distinction between Spirit and Matter was not yet grasped by the thinkers of the oldest Upanishads. For how could they have got at the concept of Spirit, when they did not possess the idea of permanent Souls? We need, however, not rely on this inference only; we can prove directly from the Upanishads themelves that they do not yet distinguish principally between Spirit and Matter. For this purpose we will examine some passages in the sixth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad where the evolution of the world from original Being (*sat*) is taught. In the second Khaṇḍa Uddālaka declares to Śvetaketu, his son. 'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only, without a Second' सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्. Here the question has been raised already in old times whether this *Sat* is Spirit or Matter. For we learn from the first Sūtras of the *Brahma Sūtra* as explained by the commentators, that the Sānkhyas declared the *Sat* to be primeval matter, called *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* in their system. But the Vedāntins identified the *Sat* with Brahma which is essentially spiritual. Their argument against the Sānkhya view is contained in the 5th. Sūtra (*ikṣhaternāśabdam*). For the text quoted above continues: 'It (*Sat*) thought, may I be many, may I grow forth It sent forth fire.' तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत.

The Vedantin's argument is that 'thinking' cannot be predicated of matter which is *acetana* not intelligent accordingly the *Sad* being intelligent because it 'thought' is what we call Spirit. The argument of the Vedāntin would be unimpeachable, if the author of the Upanishad had distinguished Spirit and Matter in the same way as the Vedāntin did, which however he did not. For he continues: 'That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent for the water'. तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत. And again: 'Water thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth earth (food): ता आप ऐक्षन्त बह्व्यः स्याम प्रजायेमहीति ता अन्नमसृजन्त. Now there can be no dobut that Fire, Water, and Earth, however subtile they may have been imagined by the author or the Upanishad, must be classsed with Matter, and not with Spirit. Yet they too 'thought' *aikshata;* and if 'thinking' did prove that the *Sat* is Spirit then those elements too had likewise to be considered to be Spirit. It is true that in the next Khaṇḍa the *Sat* is called *devatā* but the same designation is also given to Fire, Water and Earth. They would, therefore, at the same time be Spirit as well as Matter. This is an actual dilemma, and there is no other way out of it than to assume that in the period of the oldest Upanihads the distinction between Matter and Spirit had not yet clearly been grasped however difficult it may be for modern thinkers to realize such an attitude of the primitive mind.

The language of the oldest Upanishads gives evidence to the correctness of the view I have sought to establish. For those words which in

its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtilest portion mind. (1). Water when drunk becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes urine, its middle portion blood, its subtilest portion breath. (2). Fire when eaten becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes bone, its middle portion marrow, its subtilest portion speech. (3). For truly, my child, mind comes of earth, breath of water, speech of fire (4).

अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते। तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तत्पुरीषं भवति यो मध्यमस्तन्मांसं योऽणिष्ठस्तन्मनः। १। आपः पीतास्त्रेधा भवन्ति यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तन्मूत्रं भवति यो मध्यमस्तल्लोहितं योऽणिष्ठः स प्राणः। २। तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा भवति यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तदस्थि भवति यो मध्यमः स मज्जा योऽणिष्ठः सा वाक्। ३। अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वागिति। ४। Mind, breath, and speech combined form the psyche of man; they consist of the subtilest essence; *animā*, as it is called in the next Khaṇḍa, of earth, water, and fire. But a still more subtile *animā* than those spoken of before, is the *Sat* which upholding the psyche makes it a soul jïva, as may be gathered from the following two passages. 'When a man departs from hence, his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath, in fire, fire in the Highest Being (i. e. *Sat*). Now that which is that subtile essence (the root of all) in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self and thou, Śvetaketu art it.' (8th, Khaṇḍa 6. 7.)

अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् स य एषोऽणिमा। ६। ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति। ७।

The next passage is in the IIth Khaṇḍa. This (body) indeed withers and dies when the loving Self has left it; the living Self dies not. That which is that subtile essence etc. जीव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो म्रियते इति स य एषोऽणिमा इत्यादि. The last sentence (*Sa ya eṣo aṇima* etc.) occurs nine times in our text. It inculcates the great teaching of the Upanishads that Brahma is the root of all. The word *brahma*, however, does not occur in the whole of the 6th Prapâṭhaka; but in the eighth (8, 4) it is said: 'the name of this Brahma is the True' एतस्य ब्रह्मणो नाम सत्यमिति.

It will be seen that *jīva* in the second passage comes much nearer of our concept of Soul, but it differs from it in one essential point; it does not possess permanent personality. For on *mukti* this *jīva* merges in Brahma and loses its individuality (see above, *na pretya Saṁjñāstīti*). According to the teaching of the Upanishad there can be no personal immortality of the Souls.

In the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka*, in the part which is ascribed to Yājñavalkya, the teaching of the Upanishads relative to Brahma and the souls has reached its highest development. The *Chhāndogya Up.* does not attempt to define the nature of Brahma, but according to Yājñavalkya its nature is pure intelligence.[1] Thus we read II 4 12: Thus verily, O Maitreyī does this great Being, endless, unlimited, *consisting of nothing but knowledge* rise from out these elements, and vanish again in them. There is no consciousness in

1 At the end of III 9 we read the following definition of Brahma: *Vijñānam ānandaṁ Brahma.*

death'. एवं वा अरे महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन[1] एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति.

Yājñavalkya had no doubt recognized the paramount importance of intelligence (*vijñāna*) not only for the conception of the highest Being (*Brahma*) but also, and perhaps primarily, for that of the human soul. For *Bṛh. Ār.* III 7, 16-23 contains a discussion of the several constituent parts of the psyche; there we meet with a set of eight instead of the usual five *prāṇas* spoken of above in the first chapter, the additional ones being *tvac*, *vijñānam* and *retaḥ*. The importance of *vijñāna* is apparent in the explanation of sleep in II 1, 17 put in the mouth of Ajātaśatru, king of Kāśī. 'When this man is thus asleep, then the intelligent person (*purusha*) having through the intelligence of the *prāṇas* absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the space, which is in the heart. When he takes in these different kinds of intelligence, then it is said that the man sleeps. Then the breath is kept in, speech is kept in, hearing is kept in, seeing is kept in, the mind is kept in.' यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषस्तदेषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादाय य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते । तानि यदा गृह्णाति अथ हैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम । तद्गृहीत एव प्राणो भवति गृहीता वाग् गृहीतं चक्षुर्गृहीतं श्रोत्रं गृहीतं मनः ॥ This *vijñānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ* comes still nearer to our conception of soul than the *jīva* of the *Chhāndogya Up.*; but like the latter it has no permanent existence, and in *mukti* it merges in Brahma. It is worth remarking that the *Kaushītaki Up.* which appare-

1 The parallel passage IV 5, 13 has *Prajñānaghana* instead of *Vijñānaghana*.

discerned, the theories of retribution (*Karma*) and of metempsychosis (*punar janma*). From the passage about Karma quoted in the first chapter we learn that this subject was not to be discussed in public; we thence conclude that at that time the theory of Karma was not yet generally known and accepted, as it certainly was ever since, but was still regarded as an arcanum, a secret teaching, not to be divulged to the masses. The migration of souls, first appearing in the Upanishads, is several times hinted at in them; at some length it is explained in *Brh. Ār.* VI 2, and *Chānd. Up.* V. 10. Waving minor differences the opinion is that the souls first go to the moon, and those which are to be reembodied descend thence. They finally reach earth as rain and become food; he who eats it, will become the father of the individual in his new birth. It goes without saying that this belief is widely different from the theory of rebirth as it has been understood during the middle age of Indian history down to the present day.

PART THE SECOND.

The Vedic period closes with the group of the oldest Upanishads from which we have largely drawn materials for the investigation conducted in the preceding part. There are, however, three more groups of younger, and even quite late Upanishads to be enumerated presently. They too are severally ascribed by tradition to one or other of the four Vedas; but they differ in many respects, to such a degree from the oldest group that they must be placed in an altogether

different period. After the oldest group there is an unmistakable break in this branch of Sanskrit Literature occasioned most probably by a longer interval of time during which new currents of thought had set in and had been gradually modifying the mental physiognomy of the Vedic period. From this transition-period may be dated the middle ages of India.

The Upanishads have chronologically been divided by the late Professor Deussen into four groups. To the first group belong the oldest Upanishads. The three remaining groups are the following. 2. the meterial Upanishads: *Kāṭhaka*, *Īśa*, *S'vetāśvatara Muṇḍaka*, and *Mahanārāyaṇa*; 3. the younger Upanishads in prose: *Praśna*, *Maitrāyaṇīya*, and *Māṇḍūkya*; 4. the host of late Upanishads ascribed to the *Atharva Veda*. The fourth group may be neglected for the purpose of our inquiry; but I shall have to add some remarks about the second and third groups in order to make good my assertion that between them and the oldest group there is a well defined break.

I have already mentioned above a few of terms (*cetanā* etc.) which are absent in the first group and become current in the younger ones. The number of such new words which have been collected from Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the principal Upanishads, Bombay. S. S. 1891, amounts to more than a hundred. I transcribe here some in way of illustration; nouns; *avyakta*, *ahaṁkāra*, *kāraṇa*, *tanu* (body), *deha*, *dehin*, *dravya*, *nivṛtti*, *pariṇāma*, *prakṛti*, *phala* (result), *moksha*,

vahni, śakti, sarvaga, sarvajña, sūkshma; verbs: *udbhū, upalabh, tyaj, niyam, pariṇam, prārth, bandh, vyañj, vyāpa* with many of their derivatives.

The absence of these words in the oldest Upanishads may, in a few cases, be accidental, but on the whole it must be real; for the first group is of considerable extent and of nearly double the bulk of the second and third groups taken together. In some cases a word is quite common in groups 2 and 3, but occurs only once in the first group, e. g. *indriya* organ of sense (*Kaushitaki*), *jñāna* (*Taittiriya*), *yoga* (ib.), *nitya* (*Bṛhad* Ār.) &c. The change in the vocabulary of the language proves that the texts which exhibit it are of a later date, and indicates, at the same time, that new ideas had risen to express which the new words were employed. Most important in the latter regard are the following facts. In the Śvetāśvatara we meet with the Sānkhya terms *guṇa* (1, 3) and *pradhāna* (1, 10), and in 1. 4. 5 the principal ideas of Sānkhya are enumerated under the simile of a wheel; in other Upanishads of the 2nd and 3rd groups several of the leading ideas of Sānkhya are referred to and made the basis of further speculations. There can be no doubt that in the interval between the first and the second group of Upanishads the rise of the Sānkhya philosophy had taken place. The same is probable also with regard to Yoga-philosophy, because of its intimate connection with Sānkhya. Yoga is mentioned by name in several of the younger Upanishads in which Sānkhya terms occur; but [illegible] be

made out whether they refer to the Yoga-philosophy or to Yoga-practice in general.

The rise of Sāṅkhya-Yoga is, however, merely a symptom not the true cause of the radical change occurring at that epoch. Without underrating the importance and influence of the new philosophy, we may feel confident that a more powerful agent was needed to completely modify the mental attitude of whole nation, or at least that of its leading classes. I can imagine no weightier cause to bring about this result than the wide-spread belief in the personal immortality of the souls which was at that time, as will be proved in the sequel, first introduced. For this doctrine, when once proclaimed was sure to gain the willing assent of the majority of the people who are naturally averse to believe in their annihilation or, what practically comes to the same, in the loss of consciousness after death. The doctrine of the permanent existence of souls leads logically to the distinction of Matter and Spirit which also was not yet recognized in the oldest Upanishads. Now both these doctrines make part already of the oldest philosophies, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, and of Jainism. Of much later origin are the Vaiśeshika and Nyāya philosophies; they also have admitted both tenets into their system. Even the Vedānta philosophy expounded by Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahma Sūtra*, though it pretends to systematize only the teachings of the Upanishads, declares that *jīva* is eternal and indestructible, whatever Śaṅkarāchārya by a forced interpretation of the Sūtras may

allege to the contrary (as has been convincingly shown by Abhayakumar Gupa in 'Jīvātman in the Brahma Sūtras', Calcutta 1921). Sutra in this regard goes a step beyond the younger Upanishads *Kāṭhaka* and *S'vetāsvatar* which dwell on the diversity of the individual souls from Brahma, though on the other hand they maintain also their identity with it.—The belief in the personal immortality of the souls was, however, only the principal factor in bringing about the new modes of thoughts that obtained in post-vedic and classical times; it co-operated with the theories of Karman and of the migration of souls which were of somewhat older origin, for, as stated above, they were already known, though in an undeveloped and as it were nascent form, just before the close of the Vedic period. They reached their final form which is met with in all Indian religions and philosophies except Materialism, at later time probably together with the new soul-theory.

Now to return to the question at issue it may be stated that Sānkhya, Yoga and Jainism are the oldest systems which came to the front after the close of the Vedic period. They teach all those novel doctrines just now, especially the plurality of immortal souls and the heterogeneity of Matter and Spirit. Although they have developed these general ideas which they have in common, on divergent lines, still some details which will be discussed later seem to point to a kind of remoter affinity. The agreement in the metaphysical basis of Sānkhya and Jaina philosophy can be accounted for by the assumption that

these systems rose into existence in about the same age, and naturally worked out the ideas current in it, but in different ways peculiar to each of them. The supposition of contemporaneous origin of Sānkhya and Jainism furnishes us with the clue for fixing approximately the corresponding date. All we know about the age of Sānkhya and Yoga is that according to Kauṭilya they and the Lokāyatam were the only brahmanical philosophical systems existent at his time, i. e. about 300 B. C.; they were of course much older. We are better informed about the antiquity of Jainism. Scholars now agree that Jainism was not *founded* by Mahāvīra, but that one at least of his predecessors, Pārśvanātha was an historical person. Now the Nirvāṇa of Pārśva is separated from that of Mahāvīra by an interval of 250 years, and since the latter was an older contemporary of Buddha whose Nirvāṇa occurred about 484 B. C., Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa may be placed about 490 B. C., and consequently that of Pārśva about 740 B. C. Therefore the first part of the eighth century B. C. was the time during which Pārśva propagated his creed, and for practical purposes the same period may be assigned to the rise of historical Jainism and the origin of the Sānkhya and Yoga philosophies. Assuming the space of two centuries for the development and general acceptance of the novel doctrines in question we may place the close of the Vedic period in the beginning of the first millennium B. C.

Before discussing those doctrines of the Sānkhyas and Jainas which bear some resemblance to each other as regards the underlying general

idea, but differ in other regards, I must remark that our knowledge of Sānkhya and Yoga is unfortunately derived from late sources. The oldest work extant on Sānkhya is Īśvara Kṛshṇa's *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* which belong to the fifth century A. D. The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali seems to be a comparatively late work; the Yoga it teaches has largely been borrowed from Sāṅkhya, and this is still more the case with the Yogabhāshya by Vyāsa who frequently cites passages from older writers on Sānkhya. It is, therefore, in many cases not possible to decide whether a particular doctrine explained by him is to be ascribed to Sānkhya or Yoga. For our purposes we may regard both systems as fundamentally one, wherefore they will be spoken of as Sānkhya-Yoga.

We shall first examine the idea of Matter as conceived by Sānkhya-Yoga and Jainism. They agree in this that matter is permanent as regards its existence, but indefinite as regards quality; indeed, according to their opinion, matter is something which may become anything.* This opinion appears to have been generally current at the time when mattar was first recognized as something radically different from Spirit, i. e. the souls, and to have been immediately derived from the older idea of the Chaos or *sat*, the one substance which gave origin to all things, both material and spiritual. At a later time, however, the original view of matter just explained was superseded by the opposite one, that matter is also definite and unchangeable as regards quality, i. e. that it comprises the four or five elements (*bhūtas*)

which are entirely distinct from one another. This opinion was held by the Lokāyatas who are younger in origin than Sānkhya-Yoga, and it was adopted by the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophies which seem to have somehow been developed from the Lokāyatam. The unanimous opposition of the later philosophies in this regard to Sānkhya–Yoga and Jainism is a collateral proof of the latter having been coeval in origin. But they have developed the common general idea of matter on entirely different lines. The Jains declare matter (*Pudgala*) to be atomical, the Sānkhyas teach that primeval matter (*prakṛti* or *pradhāna*) is an all-pervading substance (*vibhu*) The atoms according to the Jainas are indefinite as regards quality; they may be in a gross (*bādara*) or subtile (*sūkṣma*) state; in the former they occupy one point of space (*pradeśa*) each in the latter an infinite number of them may be simultaneously present in the same point; by the combintion of gross atoms all things in the world are produced except of course the souls (*jīva*) and the substances *ākāśa, dharma* and *adharma* about which I shall have to say a word below. According to the Sānkhyas primeval matter consists of the three Guṇas *sattvaṁ, rajaḥ* and *tamah* of which I had already occasion to speak above in the 2nd. chapter; all three are present everywhere in the *pradhāna* and by acting on one another and mixing in various proportions they produce a series of substances *mahān, ahṁkāra, etc.* down to the five elements which build up all material things in the world. It would seem that the original Sānkhya dispensed with atoms. But as stated in the *Nyāya Vārttika*

p. [?] some Sānkhya or Yoga author did assume atoms; Gauḍapāda in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* several times mentions them without disapproval; in the *Yoga Sūtra* I 40 they are also admitted, likewise in the Bhāshya on I 40. 43. 44. III 52. IV. 14, cf. Vācaspatimiśra's comment on I 44. These facts seem to prove that the atomistic theory enjoyed such general favour that even the Sānkhyas and Yogas connived at it, if not from the very beginning, but certainly in the course of time.

I now turn to the Soul-theory of Sānkhya-Yoga and Jainism. There is agreement with regard to some fundamental aspects of it. Souls are immaterial and eternal; essentially they are intelligent, but their intelligence is obscured by their connexion with matter which is without beginning and ends with Mukti. The Jainas have a tenet about the size of the Soul (*jīva*) not shared by any other philosopher. For they teach that the soul is of finite and variable size, being always coextensive with the body which it occupies for the time being. It is probable that the original Sānkhya was not explicit on this point. For according to the ancient teacher Pañchaśikha, as quoted in the *Yogabhāṣya* on I 36, the souls (*purushas*) are infinitesimally small (*aṇumātra*), while according to Īśvara Kṛshṇa and all later writers it is all-pervading (*vibhu*).—Greater still is the difference of opinion between Sānkhya-Yoga and Jainism on the nature of the bondage of the soul and its delivery from it; but it would be to no purpose to explain and compare both

theories since they have nothing whatever in common. Two more doctrines, however peculiar to Jainism, are worth noticing: that about the elementary souls (*ekendriyas*) which are embodied in particles of earth, water, wind and fire, and that about the *nigodas*. These doctrines, especially the former, bear some affinity to animistic views which probably obtained in popular religion. At any rate difference in most details regarding matter as well as souls is so pronounced as to preclude the assumption that Sānkhya should have borrowed from Jainism, or Jainism from Sānkhya.

Before closing our inquiry I mention two more points about which the Sānkhyas and Jains do not exactly agree, but entertain ideas which appear to have a curious affinity with each other. The Jainas assume two transcendental substances Dharma and Adharma as the substrata of motion and rest; without them motion and rest would be impossible, they are in *alokākāśa* where they are absent. Their function is to render motion and rest of things possible. *Ākāśa* is not sufficient for that purpose, as its function is restricted to the making room for them (गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोरुपग्रहः । आकाशस्यावगाहः *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* V 17–18.). The Jainas, evidently, thought it necessary to account for motion and rest by assuming two special substances as their conditioning cause. Now Sānkhya-Yoga alone of all Indian philosophies has likewise tried to explain motion and rest as being caused by two substantial principles *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. For *rajaḥ* is necessary for motion, and immobility is caused by *tamaḥ*. Immobility

or rest is, however, but one aspect of *tamaḥ*, another is 'iniquity' *adharma*. This character of *tamaḥ* consisting in Adharma proves the near relation between Sāṅkhya *tamaḥ* and Jaina Adharma and explains at the same time why the substratum of immobility has been named by the Jainas by the strange name Adharma.

A favourite dogma of the Jainas is the Anekāntavāda, which is elaborately explained and defended by Haribhadra in his famous work *Anekāntajayapatākā*. According to this theory the Real has infinite attributes (*ananta-dharmātmakatvena tattvam* Hemachandra), wherefore all predicaments about things are one sided, the contrary being also true from another point of view (*Syādvāda*). Now Sāṅkhya-Yoga lays claim to a similar view with regard, however, to Matter only, and this doctrine designated by phrases expressing the denial of *aikāntikatva*, e.g. Vācaspatimiśra commenting on *Yoga Sūtra* II 23 speaks of the Yogas as *aikāntikatvaṁ vyāsedhantaḥ*, and Vyāsa on III 13 uses the phrase *ekāntānabhyupagamāt*. Of course, the opinions of the Jainas and Sāṅkhya in this regard are far from being identical, but they agree in the peculiar mode of thinking concerning Anekānta.

Here I may conclude the present enquiry. It was my aim to show that Jainism together with Sāṅkhya-Yoga is the earliest representative of that mental revolution which brought about the close of the Vedic and inaugurated the new period of Indian culture which has lasted through the middle ages almost down to the present time.

Bonn, 19th, March 1922 H. JACOBI

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N. B.—Figures indicate page numbers and fn means foot-note.